

AD-A054 497

ARINC RESEARCH CORP ANNAPOLIS MD

F/G 1/2

DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE FLIGHT SAFETY MODELS. VOLUME 16. FEASI--ETC(U)

JUN 76

F09603-72-A-1132

UNCLASSIFIED

C54-01-1-1406-VOL-16

NL

1 OF 1
AD
A054497



END
DATE
FILMED
6-78
DDC

FOR FURTHER TRAN

APSO

Final Report

A054496

DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE
FLIGHT SAFETY MODELS

Volume 16

FEASIBILITY OF ADAPTING MODEL
TO ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT;

EXAMPLE: **UH-1N**

June 1976

Prepared for

SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION
SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas

Under Contract F09603-72-A-1132-SA01

Publication C54-01-1-1406

ARINC

RESEARCH CORPORATION

This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

AD A054497

AD No.

DDC FILE COPY



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER C54-01-1-1406 ✓	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE FLIGHT SAFETY MODELS VOLUME 16		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
7. AUTHOR(s) Not Listed		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER C54-01-1-1406
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS ARINC Research Corporation ✓ 2551 Riva Road Annapolis, Maryland 21401		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) F09603-72-A-1132-SA01
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER Kelly Air Force Base, Texas		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER Kelly Air Force Base, Texea		12. REPORT DATE June 1976
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 53
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The feasibility of applying the Flight Safety Prediction Technique to rotary wing aircraft is demonstrated through its application to the UH-1N helicopter. A complete safety model, compatible with the computer program used for a fixed wing aircraft, is presented.		


UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

		<p>62-01-1-100</p>
	<p>DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE FLIGHT SAFETY MODEL</p>	<p>VOLUME 16</p>
<p>62-01-1-100</p>		<p>Not Listed</p>
<p>60003-72-A-1132-BAD1</p>		<p>Not Listed</p>
<p>June 1976</p>	<p>SAFETY RESEARCH CORPORATION 2521 River Road Annapolis, Maryland 21401</p>	<p>SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER Kelly Air Force Base, Texas</p>
<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER Kelly Air Force Base, Texas</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>
		<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>

The feasibility of applying the Flight Safety Prediction Technique to rotary wing aircraft is demonstrated through its application to the UH-1H helicopter. A complete safety model, compatible with the computer program used for a fixed wing aircraft, is presented.

9 Final Report,
6 DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE
FLIGHT SAFETY MODELS,
Volume 16
FEASIBILITY OF ADAPTING MODEL
TO ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT;
EXAMPLE: UH-1N



12 84 p.

11 Jun 76

DDC
RECEIVED
MAY 31 1978
F

Prepared for
SERVICE ENGINEERING DIVISION
SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
Under Contract F09603-72-A-1132-SA01

ARINC RESEARCH CORPORATION
HEADQUARTERS
2551 Riva Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
SANTA ANA BRANCH
1222 E. Normany Place
Santa Ana, California 92702

Publication C54-11-1-146-VOL-16

This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

400 247

set

Copyright © 1976
ARINC Research Corporation

Prepared under Contract F09603-72-A-1132-SA01,
which grants to the U. S. Government a license
to use any material in this publication for govern-
ment purposes.

4

ABSTRACT

The feasibility of applying the Flight Safety Prediction Technique to rotary wing aircraft is demonstrated through its application to the UH-1N helicopter. A complete safety model, compatible with the computer program used for a fixed wing aircraft, is presented.

ACCESSION for		White Section <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HIS		Buff Section <input type="checkbox"/>
NDC		
UNANNOUNCED		
JUSTIFICATION		
BY		
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES		
Dist.	REL	and/or SPECIAL
R		

GLOSSARY

Safety-related terms used in this report are defined below. Certain of these terms are expressed in somewhat different words later in the text, depending on the context of the discussion; but the meaning will be consistent with the definitions given here.

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| Criticality | - A numerical index of the significance of equipment failure history relative to aircraft safety. As an analysis parameter, criticality can be considered proportional to the likelihood that an item will fail and thereby cause an accident. It is the product of the failure probability and the sensitivity of an equipment item. |
| Dependency | - See "link dependency". |
| FSPT | - Flight Safety Prediction Technique |
| Flight phases | - Discrete segments of the aircraft mission profile. For rotary wing aircraft, the flight phases are defined as 1) startup and taxi, 2) takeoff, 3) climb, 4) cruise, 5) tactics, 6) cruise, 7) descent, 8) land, and 9) taxi and shutdown. |
| Functional analysis | - The determination of equipment relationships to aircraft functions performed, and the interrelationships of these functions. |
| Functional path | - The compilation of functional relationship in which one function is identified as being dependent upon another. |
| Link dependency | - The conditional probability of a dependent function failing, given that a particular function it is dependent upon has failed. |
| Provisory condition | - Operation of an aircraft in a mode or environment such that the safety-related importance of certain equipments is increased. Provisory conditions include icing, night flights, supersonic flight, etc. |
| Provisory factor | - The probability that a provisory condition exists. Also used to describe the coded notation serving to indicate that a functional relationship is dependent on a particular provisory condition. |

Safety sensitivity - Same as "sensitivity".

Sensitivity - A quantitative indication of the degree of safety degradation to be expected if a function or equipment fails. The more specific terms are "functional sensitivity" or "equipment item sensitivity".

FOREWORD

This document is part of a 16-volume report describing the application to specific aircraft of ARINC Research Corporation's Flight Safety Prediction Technique (FSPT). The technique was developed under previous Air Force contracts (see Appendix A). The present effort, undertaken in 1972 under Contract F09603-72-1132-SA01, has led to further refinement of the FSPT through its broad application to many different types of aircraft. The flight safety models generated for these aircraft are presented in individual volumes of this report as follows:

<u>Volume</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
2	T-38	10	B-52G, H
3	F-111A, FB-111A	11	C-130E
4	A-7D	12	KC-135
5	F-4D, E; and RF-4C	13	C-5A
6	C-141	14	T-39
7	A-37	15	F-15
8	O-2	16	Rotary Wing (Feasibility Study)
9	OV-10		

Volume 1, an overall summary of this effort, will be issued at the end of the contract period.

SUMMARY

This study concerned the feasibility of applying the Flight Safety Prediction Technique to rotary wing aircraft. It was found that the model developed for fixed wing aircraft was applicable to helicopters without change to the basic mathematical structure or computer process. No change in data requirements are necessary, since the same screening methods are used to generate the UH-1N malfunction rate as for other aircraft.

To assure that the study fully documented all aspects of a model of a rotary-wing aircraft, and that the model would perform as for previous fixed-wing models, a specific helicopter type - the UH-1N - was chosen for analysis.

Primary areas of modification to the FSPT to accommodate rotary wing aircraft included:

- a. Redefinition of certain upper level functions in accordance with rotary-wing systems operation.
- b. Redefinition of flight phases to conform with rotary-wing mission profiles.
- c. Review of sensitivity assignments in light of autorotative and "land-most-anywhere" criteria.
- d. Redefinition of a provisory factor.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
GLOSSARY	v
FOREWORD	vii
SUMMARY	ix
1. INTRODUCTION.	1-1
1.1 Background	1-1
1.2 Format of Report	1-2
2. METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING FSPT	2-1
2.1 Definition of Safe Aircraft	2-1
2.2 Mathematical Basis of FSPT	2-1
2.3 Sensitivity Assignments	2-2
3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT.	3-1
3.1 Functional Analysis	3-2
3.2 Major-Function Sensitivity Assignment	3-4
3.2.1 Assignment Method	3-4
3.2.2 Link Dependency Assignment	3-7
3.2.3 Provisory Factors	3-7
3.2.4 Computer Processing	3-7
3.2.5 Model Maintenance	3-8
4. UH-1N MODEL DEVELOPMENT	4-1
APPENDIX A: Historical Summary of FSPT	A-1
APPENDIX B: Formulation of Criticality-Assessment Technique	B-1
APPENDIX C: FSPT Documentation Methods	C-1
APPENDIX D: FSPT Documentation of UH-1N Aircraft.	D-1

ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
1-1	Example of Criticality Ranking Process	1-2
3-1	Activities and Data Inputs to Flight Safety Criticality Assessment	3-1
3-2	Hierarchical Structure of Aircraft Functions	3-3
3-3	Phases of Aircraft Mission	3-6

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
3-1	Provisory Factor Codes	3-8
4-1	UH-1N System Documentation	4-1

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The Flight Safety Prediction Technique developed by ARINC Research Corporation provides for assessment of the impact on flight safety of the failure of specific items of equipment within an aircraft. In the FSPT, mathematical modeling procedures are applied for processing aircraft-equipment failure data to yield a quantified index ranking safety-related problems on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence and the resulting degradation in the aircraft's capability to fly.

The ranking factor is called "criticality", which in its simplest form is the product of the failure probability and flight safety sensitivity of an equipment. (A more detailed definition appears in Section 2 and Appendix B.) The failure probability inputs are from basic failure data sources, AFM 66-1 and 65-110. The sensitivity estimates are derived by the following process:

- a. Systematic analysis of aircraft functions to determine those essential to flight safety;
- b. Identification of the hardware required to perform these functions;
- c. Evaluation of the safety significance of the hardware in performing these essential aircraft functions.

The criticality values resulting from this approach provide a relative ranking of all malfunctions with respect to their safety significance. Figure 1-1 is a simplified example of how three equipment items would be ranked on the combined basis of their failure probability and safety sensitivity.

The methodology has the ability to rank malfunction problems currently and continuously by their accident potential. This ranking, based on criticality assessment can provide the basic parameters necessary for:

- a. Identifying equipment items whose failure history and application pose a threat to aircraft safety;
- b. Quantifying the degree of threat associated with each equipment item;
- c. Evaluating and tracking the effectiveness of modifications to the aircraft;
- d. Assessing safety benefits versus the cost of proposed aircraft modifications, changes in maintenance or flight operations, or alternative aircraft designs.




Figure 1-1. Example of Criticality Ranking Process

1.2 FORMAT OF REPORT

In this report, Section 2 will briefly describe the mathematical concepts underlying the Flight Safety Prediction Technique. Section 3 will discuss the model development and utilization of the technique in application for fixed-wing and then for rotary-wing aircraft. The similarities and differences will be noted. Section 3 will also discuss the general application of these concepts to the development of safety models for fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, while Section 4 describes application activities related specifically to the UH-1N helicopter.

Appendix A summarizes the contractual history of the development of the FSPT; Appendix B discusses (as a supplement to Section 2) mathematical considerations underlying the technique; Appendix C discusses FSPT documentation methods; and Appendix D presents functional relationship diagrams and a listing of keypunch cards that comprise the safety model documentation for the UH-1N helicopter.

2

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING FSPT

This section discusses the basic definitions and mathematical concepts associated with the Flight Safety Prediction Technique.

2.1 DEFINITION OF SAFE AIRCRAFT

To develop a relative measure of aircraft safety degradation resulting from specific equipment malfunctions, it is first necessary to define a "safe" aircraft. For purposes of the FSPT assessments, an aircraft is assumed to be in a safe condition if it is operating within its prescribed performance limits. Conversely, an aircraft operating (or about to operate) outside these limits is considered to be unsafe, i. e., in a condition where property damage and personal injury may result.

The safety prediction methodology does not attempt to assess the extent of possible personal injury or aircraft damage resulting from an unsafe condition. Neither does the concept consider ejection capability, parachutes, life rafts, etc., which do not make an aircraft safer per se but provide for the survivability of the aircrew when the aircraft is unsafe. Collision is also excluded from consideration because of the complexity of the interrelationships between pilot, aircraft equipment, ground surveillance, and traffic density.

2.2 MATHEMATICAL BASIS OF FSPT

The probability of an accident caused by the failure of an element can be expressed as the probability of the element failing multiplied by the conditional probability that the failure of the element will cause an accident. Stated in equation form:

$$P(A, J) = P(j)P(A|j) \quad (1)$$

where:

$P(A, J)$ = Probability of an accident due to failure of just the j^{th} element*

$P(j)$ = Probability that element j fails

$P(A|j)$ = Probability of an accident given that the j^{th} element fails.

*In this and subsequent discussions, unless otherwise stated, expressions such as "failure of the j^{th} element" should be interpreted to mean: failure of only the j^{th} element, assuming all other elements are not failed.

This equation reflects the basic relationships addressed in the FSPT where:

- a. The criticality of the j^{th} element is an estimate of $P(\mathcal{A}, j)$
- b. The sensitivity of the j^{th} element is an estimate of $P(\mathcal{A}|j)$
- c. The failure probability of the j^{th} element is an assessment of $P(j)$.

Because an element's effect on safety may depend on the mission phase (see Section 3.2.1), the above model can be expanded to:

$$P(\mathcal{A}, j) = \sum_{k=1}^N P_{j,k} P(\mathcal{A}|j, k) \quad (2)$$

where

- N = Number of mission phases
- $P_{j,k}$ = Probability that the j^{th} element is failed in the k^{th} phase
- $P(\mathcal{A}|j, k)$ = The j^{th} element's sensitivity in the k^{th} phase.

To identify the importance of discrete elements to aircraft safety, two flight profiles consisting of nine distinct phases were defined, one for fixed-wing and the other for rotary-wing aircraft. The phases are discussed in Section 3.2.1.

To utilize equation 1, it was necessary to develop a method for obtaining the values of $P(\mathcal{A}|j, k)$, the probability that a malfunction in element j during mission phase k will result in an accident. This method in turn requires the estimation of two parameters: the probability of accident if a major function is not available during each mission phase, and the dependence of the major function on subfunctions and elements during each such phase.* Each function and equipment item thus derives its sensitivity value from its relationship to the major function(s) dependent upon it.

2.3 SENSITIVITY ASSIGNMENTS

A great deal of information is available on the causes of aircraft accidents, but little exists from which to make the sensitivity assignments, $P(\mathcal{A}|j)$. These assignments are therefore largely subjective, based on the analyst's knowledge of the system and any information he may have on previous accident history. The sensitivity assignments are reviewed (and revised as necessary) by an Air Force/contractor team working on a particular model to ensure that consistent criteria have been followed. The team review and negotiation of sensitivity assignments are the mechanism by which the value becomes sufficiently objective for use with the model. This negotiation considers all of those top level functions as a group, and reassigns sensitivity values as necessary to assure that the most objective proportionality is

*For a more detailed discussion of the mathematics of the FSPT, see Appendix B.

attained for the particular aircraft model. The same major-function sensitivity values are used for major functions on all aircraft models where configuration and mission profiles permit.

The development of criticality rankings for the various elements, or j's, is dependent upon the ability to quantify the failure probability, $P(j)$, and the element sensitivity, $P(A|j)$, for each element. Since the intent of the concept is to provide a relative safety ranking of all malfunctions, it is not necessary to develop absolute values for $P(A|j)$. If the sensitivity values developed are correct relative to each other, a proper criticality ranking will be established. It is intended that criticality be an index proportional to $P(A, j)$ and therefore provide the same relative rank ordering of elements. The major reasons for proportionality, rather than equality, are:

- a. The FSPT does not account for the effect of extraordinary pilot intervention to prevent an accident in case of equipment malfunction.
- b. Criticality quantification was limited in its treatment of simultaneous occurrence of independent, primary failures.

While strict proportionality cannot be mathematically proven, it is believed that the criticality rankings provide reasonable relative measures of equipment problem potential.

3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Figure 3-1 summarizes the approach to the assessment of flight-safety criticality of aircraft equipment. Both the Air Force and contractor participate in this assessment. The first contractor activity is the identification of all functions that the aircraft is expected to perform and the determination of their interrelationships. Next, each functional relationship is documented, and then sensitivity assignments are made at the major functional levels. (Below these levels, link dependency values are estimated; see Section 3.2.2.) This process is carried out until each work unit code (WUC) associated with a major function has been identified with respect to the function performed, and dependencies have been estimated. Computer processing procedures calculate the safety sensitivity for each WUC item, combine these values with the operation and failure data input by the Air Force, and produce the equipment criticality ranking.

The above comments and relationships hold for both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. As will be shown in the following sections, a number of modifications in the areas of functional analysis and major function sensitivity assignment were necessary to adapt the model to accommodate rotary wing aircraft. The modifications were made to address the different physical characteristics and flight modes of the rotary wing aircraft.




Figure 3-1. Activities and Data Inputs to Flight Safety Criticality Assessment

3.1 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

Functional analysis entails the systematic identification of the relationships of hardware to the functions performed by the aircraft as documented in the aircraft Technical Orders. Tabulated for each aircraft function are the equipments necessary for its performance as well as all outputs required for other systems. The complexity of the functional interdependencies of an aircraft requires the use of a systematic accounting procedure, as discussed below, to assure that all relationships have been identified and that no functional paths have been overlooked.

Certain top-level or primary functions are applicable to all aircraft types, both fixed and rotary wing, and serve as the basis for a safety analysis. As shown in Figure 3-2, the basic differences between fixed and rotary wing aircraft are evidenced at the second or major-function level.


Below the major function level, the functional identification and structure are tailored to the particular equipment and functional relationships unique to the aircraft modeled. In Figure 3-2b, for example, the major function "Main Rotor Controls" is subdivided into "Cyclic Controls" and "Collective Controls". This structure is that applicable to a UH-1N aircraft in which cyclic controls provide primary aerodynamic life, and collective controls provide pitch and roll movements. Finally, each item in the aircraft WUC ("-06") manual is identified with respect to the function it performs.*

Except as noted above, documentation for a rotary wing aircraft can be accomplished just as for a fixed wing aircraft. Every function and every WUC included in the model receives an "alpha designator" unique to that aircraft model. Because of the large number of alpha designators required in a model, an indenturing system is utilized to prevent duplication. However, the location in the hierarchical structure and the number of characters in the alpha designators often do not correlate, since correlation is not necessary for subsequent processing.


The functional relationships from the system diagram, and identification of the equipment necessary for each function, are next documented in an 80-column punch-card format (see Appendix C). The total functional diagram for the aircraft is then a compilation of the system diagrams, with one punchcard for each functional link.

With the aircraft functions completely documented, the functional paths by which a piece of equipment contributes to the operation of the aircraft can be identified by computer. Performing the path-identification/documentation task by computer proves to be not only useful but necessary - the human analyst could neither keep track of nor assign sensitivity values to all functional paths. The machine processing capability allows the analyst to consider only one functional link at a time. The ability to follow all of the functional interrelationships within the aircraft, which is necessary for meaningful assessment of safety, is then provided by the computer.

*Certain WUC items in the "-06" manual may not be included in the safety model, these items being either 1) eliminated by TCTOs, 2) purely structural items in the 11000 series, 3) necessary only for survivability or ejection, or 4) of lower indenture than the LRU level, where computer data screening eliminates failure reports.



a. Fixed Wing Aircraft Functions



b. Rotary Wing Aircraft Functions

Figure 3-2. Hierarchical Structure of Aircraft Functions

3.2 MAJOR-FUNCTION SENSITIVITY ASSIGNMENT

3.2.1 Assignment Method

As stated earlier, the sensitivity of a function or equipment item is an estimate of the probability that its failure will cause an accident. From functional analysis of the aircraft under consideration, major functions are identified and are assigned sensitivity values for each phase of the mission.

The relative importance of primary, major, and other functions is not necessarily constant throughout a flight. The failure, for example, of one engine of a multi-engine aircraft is far more critical on takeoff than it is during the rest of the flight, and is of relatively little importance during startup and taxi. To accommodate this variability of importance, the mission of an aircraft is divided into nine flight phases, which for fixed wing aircraft are as follows:

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Description</u>
1. Startup and taxi	After engine rotation and prior to assuming takeoff heading on runway.
2. Takeoff	After assuming takeoff heading; roll on runway; and prior to gear-up.
3. Climb	From gear-up to attainment of cruise altitude.
4. Cruise outbound	From the end of climb to initiation of tactical phase.
5. Tactical	Performance of operations uniquely identified with the aircraft mission, such as gunnery, air-to-air intercept, stores release, cargo drop, etc.
6. Cruise return	After achieving recovery heading and prior to descent-power reduction.
7. Descent	From descent-power reduction to break or localizer engage homing point.
8. Landing	From break or localizing engage homing point through stop or runway turnoff.
9. Taxi and shutdown	From runway turnoff to engine stop.


These phases are illustrated in Figure 3-3a.

The foregoing mission phases do not adequately address the flight conditions encountered during rotary wing flight, particularly that of hovering. The nine phases defined for rotary wing aircraft are as follows:


<u>Phase</u>	<u>Description</u>
1. Startup (and taxi for wheeled helicopters)	After engine rotation and prior to liftoff.
2. Hover out (airborne taxi)	From liftoff to commencement of takeoff run.
3. Takeoff	From commencement of takeoff run through translation lift.
4. Climb out and cruise outbound	After translational lift through climbout and cruise to tactical site. For non-tactical missions, this includes the first half of the at-altitude flight.
5. Tactical	From arrival at tactical site to assumption of heading and altitude for return cruise.
6. Cruise return and descent	From assumption of return heading to speed reduction in preparation for landing. For nontactical missions, this identifies the last half of the at-altitude flight.
7. Landing to hover	From speed reduction in preparation for landing to termination of descent at a hover.
8. Hover in	From landing termination to touchdown.
9. Shutdown (includes taxi-in for wheeled helicopters)	From touchdown to engine stop.

These phases are illustrated in Figure 3-3b. By maintaining a total of nine flight phases, the model input-punchcard format remains the same as for fixed wing aircraft.

For both aircraft types (fixed and rotary wing), a sensitivity value is assigned for each phase, representing the best estimate of the likelihood that the aircraft will enter a hazardous mode if the function is not present in that phase. The numerical values assigned are proportional rather than absolute, and range from 0.0 to 1.0. The keypunch card limits this assignment to increments of 0.1. Increments smaller than 0.1, when required, are assigned by defining a quasi-function for insertion between the major function and its dependent primary function.



a. Fixed Wing Aircraft Mission



b. Rotary Wing Aircraft Mission

Figure 3-3. Phases of Aircraft Mission

3.2.2 Link Dependency Assignment

Link dependency is defined as the probability that the loss of a function will result in the loss of a dependent function. (For a more detailed discussion of this term, see Appendix B.) The assignment of link dependency values requires knowledge of the operation of specific aircraft because it is concerned only with functional levels below the "major" category. At this lower level, no evaluation is made of the impact on flight safety of the loss of functions, and no special procedures are required to accommodate rotary wing aircraft. Instead, the effect of the loss of one function on the performance of another function becomes the evaluation criterion.

Like sensitivities, link dependency values are assigned in increments of 0.1. Additionally, the method of attenuation used in assigning sensitivity values can also be applied to link dependencies.

3.2.3 Provisory Factors

The sensitivity of major functions with respect to aircraft safety — and at the lower levels, the link dependency between functions — can be dependent on external influences and aircraft operating conditions. To accommodate these external influences, a set of provisory factors has been identified. An example would be a windshield anti-ice system, which has a safety sensitivity close to 1.0 during landing under icing conditions but a negligible effect on a dry, warm day.

Under such circumstances, the procedure is to assign the worst-case value (assuming the condition exists). During model exercise the likelihood that the condition exists can be "read-in", thereby allowing the sensitivity value to be assigned by the computer based on the likelihood of the condition and the probability that the higher level function will therefore be lost. For the rotary wing safety model, one provisory factor was redefined (from its fixed wing form) to accommodate unique helicopter operating conditions. This factor is identified as Code C, in Table 3-1, which lists the standard provisory factors used in FSPT models. The specific use of the provisory factor B as applied to helicopters refers to operations in that portion of the flight envelope where auto-rotation is not available as a backup to the propulsion and auto-torque functions.

3.2.4 Computer Processing

For any aircraft, the documentation of a flight safety analysis by ARINC Research consists of functional diagrams, coded functional tabulations, a functional data processing card deck, and a machine-prepared printout of the card deck data. Under this contract the documentation is then sent to San Antonio Air Logistics Center (SA/ALC).

SA/ALC processes the functional data card deck through a series of computerized operations, as follows:

- a. A functional deck edit is accomplished to identify format or logic errors.
- b. A path identification/documentation run is made that traces all possible paths associated with each function and calculates the numerical sensitivities by flight phase down to the WUC level.
- c. A path combination run is made taking into account the dependence of more than one major function on a particular WUC.

- d. Failure information from the 66-1 data system and numerical factors for provisory conditions are input, and a WUC criticality list by rank order is generated by the computer.

Since no change in card format of other documentation methods is necessary for rotary wing application, no computer programming changes were necessary.

An additional product generated by the computer is a two-part criticality trend analysis. Part I contains the criticality rankings and linear regression analysis by WUC for the previous 12 months. Part II contains plots of the criticalities and regression lines for the 25 WUCs top-ranked according to safety criticality.

TABLE 3-1. PROVISORY FACTOR CODES

Code	Provisory Condition
A	Icing conditions
B	Adverse speed/altitude operations
C	Runway stopping distance (fixed wing) Confined area operations (helicopter)
D	Night operation
E	IFR conditions
F	Supersonic flight
G	Rain
H	Solo flight
I	Loss of function for which indication is provided
K	Normal system failed
T	Flame-out
X	Fire
Y	Cold weather
2	One of three available units is required
3	Two of three available units are required
4	One of four available units is required
5	Two of four available units are required
6	Three of four available units are required
8	Four of eight available units are required

3.2.5 Model Maintenance

Each time an aircraft type for which a safety model has been developed undergoes a modification, the effects of the changes on the model must be evaluated. Technical order and WUC revisions must be incorporated into the model. Removal of existing hardware, installation of new hardware, or design improvements may change

link dependencies and sensitivity assignments. The update procedure should follow the same general steps as outlined for the initial analysis effort.

Existing block diagrams and a printout of the functional card deck form the baseline for change identification. Functional relationships should be reviewed to determine the impact of changes on the documented safety analysis. Diagrams should be revised to reflect functional differences, WUC changes should be noted, and all differences listed on a flight-safety functional tabulation sheet. The functional deck printout can be used for manual indication of what the changes are and where they occur. New data cards are prepared and the functional deck updated by the removal of obsolete cards and the insertion of new cards. From this point on, the computer is again utilized to edit the functional deck, perform path identification/documentation, and calculate sensitivities for each WUC.

Block diagrams and other affected portions of the specific aircraft safety analysis report should be updated and revised pages issued that reflect these changes. Maintaining an accurate and updated model is important to obtaining an accurate assessment of the safety significance of hardware failures.

UH-1N MODEL DEVELOPMENT

An FSPT model for the UH-1N helicopter was developed to evaluate the feasibility of applying the modeling methodology to rotary wing aircraft. The initial step was a review of the basic FSPT model for any inconsistencies that would affect the adaptation to rotary wing application. Next, the flight phases were reviewed and redefined in accordance with helicopter flight operations. Allowances were made for hover flight, and for the differences in takeoff/landing flight characteristics between rotary and fixed wing aircraft. New and revised provisory factors were incorporated for extreme rotary wing flight conditions (i.e., high altitude hover, confined area flight maneuverability) where recovery from a system failure is less likely. The total aircraft documentation was submitted for "GO 95" computer edit at SA/ALC in July 1975.

The aircraft flight manual and maintenance technical orders provided the information on aircraft system operation. The model developed represents the UH-1N helicopter configured to the latest TCTOs documented in the manuals supplied by SA/ALC. Table 4-1 lists the manuals and their revision status applicable to the developed model.

The UH-1N safety model was developed by ARINC Research for all systems of the aircraft. Although the UH-1N is a fixed-skid aircraft, landing gear and ground control were included as primary functions to ensure consistency with the previous FSPT models and establish the precedence for the modeling of wheeled rotary wing aircraft.

Because of the vulnerability of the functional logic/sensitivity documentation of such errors as omission of links, duplication of cards, and keypunching, quality reviews were conducted at various critical points in the model development. Each card was checked against the functional links of the diagrams to assure accuracy and completeness. Work unit codes used in the model were checked against the WUC manual to assure completeness.

Appendix C presents the methods and standards used in documenting an FSPT aircraft model. Appendix D presents the FSPT documentation for the UH-1N helicopter.

TABLE 4-1. UH-1N HELICOPTER SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION

Nomenclature	Title	Revision/Date
T.O. 1H-1(U)N-1	Flight Manual	Change 3/20 Jan 75
T.O. 1H-1(U)N-2-1	Organizational Maintenance	Change 11/25 Apr 75
T.O. 1H-1(U)N-06	Work Unit Code	Change 1/8 Apr 75

APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF FSPT

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF FSPT

In 1965, the desirability and practicability of quantifying the significance of specific equipment malfunctions relative to flight safety was explored in a feasibility study conducted by ARINC Research Corporation for the Air Force. The feasibility of a safety-quantification approach, which has subsequently become known as Flight Safety Prediction Technique (FSPT), was demonstrated; and the method was developed and refined in a series of studies, as follows:

<u>Study Phase</u>	<u>Subject/Date</u>	<u>Sponsor*/Publication No.</u>
I	Feasibility Study, September 1965 to June 1967 (Phase I)	Sacramento Air Materiel Area (SMNE), Contract AF09(603)62335, SM-67-2; publication 705-01-1-777
II-A	Technique Development, October 1967 to July 1968 (Phase II-A)	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SANEW), Contract AF09(603)-67-A-0267-SA01; publication 734-01-1-895
II-B	Technique Development, July 1968 to July 1969 (Phase II-B)	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SANEW), Contract F09(603)-68-A-0317-SA01; publication 754-01-1-985 (Revision 1)
	FSPT System Documentation for the F-4C and T-37 Aircraft, October 1970 to June 1971	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (MMER) Contract F41608-71-C-0576; publication 697-01-1-1118

In the Phase II-B study, the FSPT was applied to the F-106 aircraft. Concurrent with Phase II-B, the U.S. Naval Safety Center contracted ARINC Research to extend the methodology to produce a flight safety criticality model for the F-4J aircraft. The results of this effort are documented in ARINC Research Publication 753-01-3-982 (Revision 1).

In 1970, ARINC Research was contracted to develop suitable input data to permit the application of the technique to the T-37 and F-4C aircraft. These data were derived in the form of mathematical model functional documentation as input to the basic computer program developed and applied to the F-106.

In 1972, ARINC Research Corporation was awarded a contract, with the subsequent modifications in 1973 and 1974, to apply the Flight Safety Prediction Technique to 15 aircraft, working jointly with cognizant Air Logistics Centers. Aircraft to which the FSPT has been applied under this latter contract (F09603-72-A-1132-SA01) include:

- a. T-38
- b. F-111A and FB-111A

*The office symbols of Service Engineering at the Sacramento and San Antonio Air Materiel Areas are now SM/ALC/MME and SA/ALC/MME, respectively.

- c. A-7D
- d. F-4D, E; RF-4C
- e. C-141
- f. A-37
- g. O-2
- h. OV-10
- i. B-52G, H
- j. C-130E
- k. KC-135
- l. C-5A
- m. T-39
- n. F-15
- o. UH-1N Helicopter*

*Feasibility study of adaptation of FSPT to rotary-wing aircraft.

APPENDIX B
FORMULATION OF CRITICALITY-ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE

FORMULATION OF CRITICALITY-ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE


To implement the basic safety model defined in Section 2.2, it is necessary to develop a submodel for the probability that a malfunction in element j during mission phase k will result in an accident. This submodel in turn requires that we estimate two parameters: the probability of accident if a major function is not available during each mission phase, and the dependence of the major function on element j during each mission phase.

The first parameter is termed "functional sensitivity" and is estimated for each major function. The functional analysis performed in this task established for an aircraft the following hierarchal scheme:

Aircraft
Primary functions
Major functions
Function
Elements (Work Unit Codes)

A primary function would be one such as Flight Control. Major functions under Flight Control would include Pitch Control and Yaw Control.

The second parameter, "link dependency," is a vehicle for showing the influence of each functional-path element on the performance of a major function. For example, if the major function being considered is External Lighting, the following diagram illustrates the nature of functional sensitivity and link dependency values.




The 0.8 value means that failure of the Control function will result in loss of the Landing Light function 80% of the time. The 0.1 functional sensitivity value denotes that loss of external lighting will result in an accident 10% of the time. The values must be interpreted in a proportional sense, in that the actual accident probability is dependent upon external factors (see Section 3.2.3).

The remainder of this appendix discusses the procedures and model used to obtain element sensitivities; e.g., in the above example, the accident probability given that a Work Unit Code in the Control function malfunctions.


Three principal types of functional relationship--series, redundant, and parallel--were identified as representing the major forms to consider in modeling element sensitivity.

Series Relationship - A function having only one input. Schematically,




which indicates that outside of its own elements, the success of function B is only affected by the success of function A.

Functional Redundancy - A function having one or more backup functions that can provide the required inputs to successor functions. Schematically,



where A_1 and A_2 represent a functional redundancy in that either may provide the necessary input to B.


Parallel Functions - Two or more functions independent of each other in terms of functional success, but each of which may be required for a successor function. Schematically,



B will generally require both A_1 and A_2 ; but A_1 does not depend on A_2 , nor does A_2 depend on A_1 .

In some cases the distinction between functional redundancy and parallel paths is very slight, and may depend on mission phase. For example the four engines of a plane can be considered to be a redundant configuration providing inputs to the primary propulsion function during cruising, but would generally be considered to be parallel functions during takeoffs requiring full power.

In general, given a schematic relationship of the form,




we can say that A and B are in a functionally redundant configuration if the success probability of C is the same if 1) A and B are successful, 2) A only is successful, or 3) B only is successful. If, for example, C is more likely to be successful if both A and B are successful, rather than A or B alone, then the relationship is one of parallel paths.

It is noted that the model will also account for element redundancy and parallel elements through inputs such as $P(\bar{A}|i_a)$, representing the probability that the Ath function fails given that the i_a^{th} element in A has failed. If i_a is a parallel element, the probability would depend on mission requirements and other parallel-element states.


Link dependency is the conditional probability of a functional failure, given the failure of immediate predecessor functions. The link dependencies applicable to the three basic designs defined above are shown below.

Series Relationship




Link dependency = $P(\bar{B}|\bar{A})$ = probability that B fails given that A fails.

Functional Redundancy




equivalent to



where $\bar{B} = \bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2$


Parallel Functions



We shall generally assume that the dependencies of B_1 with respect to A , and of B_2 with respect to A , are independent of each other, so that

$$P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2 | \bar{A}) = P(\bar{B}_1 | \bar{A}) P(\bar{B}_2 | \bar{A})$$

We then can consider three link dependencies from A to B as follows:




noting that

$$P(\bar{B}_1|\bar{A}) = P(\bar{B}_1 B_2|\bar{A}) + P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2|\bar{A})$$

$$P(\bar{B}_2|\bar{A}) = P(B_1 \bar{B}_2|\bar{A}) + P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2|\bar{A})$$

Models are shown below for determining the sensitivity of elements within a function for each of the three basic designs. The following basic assumptions apply:

- a. Except for cases where an element has a redundant or parallel counterpart or is located in a function with a redundant or parallel function, only the element under consideration shall be assumed to have failed initially. Thus the expression $P(A|i_a)$, representing the accident probability given failure of the i th Work Unit Code element, is based on the assumption that no other element has failed unless element i is in some redundant or parallel configuration. For cases in which there are redundant or parallel counterparts, failures of such counterpart elements or functions are considered in accordance with their occurrence probabilities.
- b. The success of all immediate predecessors ensures the success of a function, provided that the function experiences no element failures. Thus for the series function relationship




we assume

$$P(\bar{B}|A) = 0,$$

provided B experiences no element failures. If an element in function A is under consideration, the latter provision is always true by assumption "a."


The element sensitivity models are:

Series Relationship



$$P(A|i_a) = P(\bar{A}|i_a)P(\bar{B}|\bar{A})P(\bar{C}|\bar{B})P(A|\bar{C})$$


Functional Redundancy



$$P(\mathcal{A}|i_a) = P(\bar{\mathcal{A}}|i_a)P(\bar{\mathcal{B}}|\bar{\mathcal{A}})P(\bar{\mathcal{C}}|\bar{\mathcal{B}})P(\mathcal{A}|\bar{\mathcal{C}})$$

$$P(\mathcal{A}|i_{b1}) = P(\bar{\mathcal{B}}_1|i_{b1})P(\bar{\mathcal{B}}_2)P(\bar{\mathcal{C}}|\bar{\mathcal{B}})P(\mathcal{A}|\bar{\mathcal{C}})$$


Parallel Functions



$$P(\mathcal{A}|i_a) = P(\bar{\mathcal{A}}|i_a) \{ P(\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}|\bar{\mathcal{A}})P(\bar{\mathcal{D}}|\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}) + P(\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}|\bar{\mathcal{A}})P(\bar{\mathcal{D}}|\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}) \\ + P(\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}|\bar{\mathcal{A}})P(\bar{\mathcal{D}}|\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}) \} P(\mathcal{A}|\bar{\mathcal{D}})$$

$$P(\mathcal{A}|i_b) = P(\bar{\mathcal{B}}|i_b) \{ P(\bar{\mathcal{C}}|i_b)P(\bar{\mathcal{D}}|\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}) + P(\mathcal{C}|i_b)P(\bar{\mathcal{D}}|\bar{\mathcal{B}}\bar{\mathcal{C}}) \} P(\mathcal{A}|\bar{\mathcal{D}})$$

A case not explicitly included in the above three basic functional relationships is one for which a function is in two paths, e.g.,



then

$$P(A|i_a) = P(\bar{C}|i_a)P(B|i_a)P(A|\bar{C}B) + P(C|i_a)P(\bar{B}|i_a)P(A|C\bar{B}) \\ + P(\bar{C}|i_a)P(\bar{B}|i_a)\{1 - P(A|\bar{C})P(A|\bar{B})\}$$

where it is assumed that the effects of loss of the major functions in accident occurrence are independent of each other.

Use of Numerical Provisory Factors for Partially Redundant Systems

The numerical provisory factors (see Table 3-1) are used where more than two identical functions are involved in a redundancy. For example, aircraft with more than two engines often have identical and independent systems for hydraulic pressurization, and for electrical power generation, one driven by each engine. If the aircraft can be operated safely with one or more of such systems in a failed state, one of the numeric codes is utilized in assigning link dependency values. Consider, for example, the following:

If N identical and independent units* are available and at least M are required for safe operation, where $0 < M < N$, then the provisory factor of a given unit, say U_j , is the probability that the failure of U_j will cause the aircraft to enter an unsafe state. This is the probability that exactly $M-1$ of the remaining $N-1$ units will be in an unfailed state. This probability can be calculated by the formula for the binomial distribution, and is given by

$$P(U_j) = \binom{N-1}{M-1} p^{(M-1)} q^{(N-M)}$$

where $P(U_j)$ = probability that failure of the j^{th} unit will cause the aircraft to enter an unsafe state, and

M = Number of units required

N = Number of units available

p = Probability that a single unit will be in an unfailed state

q = Probability that a single unit will be in a failed state or $(1-p)$

*Units may be either elements, element assemblies, or functions.

Assignment of link dependencies to N identical and independent units of which only M are required proceeds as follows. The value assigned to each unit is the dependency of the higher level function on receiving an output from M of the units (usually 1.0). The provisory factor is the appropriate numeric code. In the evaluation of the path sensitivity, the computer is programmed to select the binomial formula that corresponds to the provisory factor listed.

APPENDIX C
FSPT DOCUMENTATION METHODS

FSPT DOCUMENTATION METHODS

Because of the extreme complexity of aircraft, it is necessary to develop a computerized method to identify and document all possible paths associated with each function as well as to determine the safety sensitivity associated with each path. A computer routine has been devised that takes the data from the functional card deck and traces and documents all paths. For each WUC, it also computes the flight-phase sensitivities for each path in which the WUC is present. The resulting computer printout provides a combined functional path sensitivity.

C.1 ALPHA CODING

As each system of the aircraft is functionally diagrammed, the functional blocks are assigned an "alpha code". This code aids the analyst in the bookkeeping tasks of functional diagramming and provides the computer with an identification of the elements to be processed. For standardization among aircraft, nine top-level functions have been defined and each has been assigned an initial or first-alpha designator. Each block in the functional diagram carries the same initial alpha as the top level function. Subsequent letters added to the initial alpha uniquely identify each block.

The only restrictions placed on the assignment of alpha codes are that:

- a. All characters in a code must be a letter of the alphabet, and
- b. The maximum number of characters in one code is seven.

C.2 ALPHA CODING AND COMPUTER PROGRAM COMPATIBILITY

Additional rules for alpha coding required to obtain the desired results from computer processing include:

- a. When a WUC item operates in the same mode to perform more than one function, the same alpha code is used in each application.
- b. When a WUC item operates in a different mode to perform each of more than one function, a different alpha designator is assigned for each operating mode.

C.3 FUNCTIONAL TABULATION

The "Flight Safety Functional Tabulation" sheet is used to code the safety model for keypunching. The sheets are coded as follows (refer to Figure C-1) for an example).

- a. Columns 1 through 3. Used to identify the aircraft represented by the model. For certain aircraft modeled under this contract more than one model - designation series MDS - was included. For instance, a single functional deck was created for four MDSs of the F-4 aircraft. Cards with "F4B"* in columns 1-3 were common to all aircraft. For example,

*B = blank

when these cards are combined with those carrying "F4E" in columns 1-3, then it produces an F-4E FSPT model deck.

- b. Columns 4 through 31. Contain the title of the function or the WUC item.
- c. Columns 32 through 36. Contain the left-justified WUC number.
- d. Columns 37 and 38. Blank
- e. Columns 39 through 46. Contain the assigned alpha designator for the function and/or the WUC. Column 39 contains either an L or an R, or is blank. The L and R designate left and right for those instances when the function and/or WUC pertains to the left or right side of the aircraft.
- f. Columns 47 and 48. Blank.
- g. Columns 49 through 55. Normally left blank, but are used after a deck is operational to substitute the data on a card for that stored in the computer by punching the line record number in this field.
- h. Columns 56 through 63. Identify the dependent functions for either the function or specific WUCs being coded. Column 56 may contain L, R or blank for the same purpose as that of column 39.
- i. Column 64. Contains the alphanumeric code of the "provisory factor" applicable to the link value assigned.
- j. Columns 65 through 69. Contain the alpha designator of a function that is an alternate for the function being coded. (Column 65 is used for "L" or "R" as in Column 39.) The presence of the "alternate alpha" flags the importance of the link dependency as being affected by the success probability of the alternate function.
- k. Column 70. Contains the work unit code dependency value (1 = 0.10; 2 = 0.20;A = 1.0). This value is applicable to all flight phases.
- l. Column 71. Contains special instructions to the computer through the use of letters F, S, or being blank. Cards with an "S" or "blank" in column 71 are used in sensitivity computations. Cards with an "F" document a functional relationships which, although present in the system, would produce an erroneous sensitivity value when combined with other nonindependent paths (having the same function in common at some higher level). The "F" prevents the computer from including the link in the sensitivity calculations.
- m. Columns 72 through 80. Contain functional dependencies for each of nine flight phases as described in Section 3.2.1 of the text. Coding is the same as for column 70.

C.4 DIAGRAM CONSTRUCTION

The diagrams produced under the contract document the functional inter-relationship of the aircraft systems considered in the model. In the interest of extending the useful life of the diagrams, WUC items are not shown, thereby eliminating the necessity of updating the diagrams with each (and sometimes frequent) change to the WUC manual.

As discussed earlier in this report, the diagrams represent the hierarchal structure of the paths from which the sensitivity values are derived. The diagrams, although consistent with the system schematic and reliability block diagrams, are not equivalent due to this hierarchal method of documentation. In the actual system, signals and/or fluids pass from one component to the next and are thus documented in schematics; conversely, the hierarchal approach only identifies the components that must operate to achieve a given function, independent of the direction and/or sequence of signal flow. This approach directly addresses the system impact of a component failure without the necessity of identifying the intrasystem secondary failures. Each line connecting functions on the diagram is documented by a punchcard, with the lower function providing the "alpha designator" and the higher function's alpha designator indicator as the "dependent function". *

*The card deck also documents functional relationships not shown on the diagram; the work unit codes (mentioned earlier) and the "S" cards discussed in paragraph C.3.1.

APPENDIX D
FSPT DOCUMENTATION OF UH-IN AIRCRAFT

FSPT DOCUMENTATION OF UH-1N AIRCRAFT

This appendix contains the functional relationship diagrams and a listing of the keypunch cards that comprise the FSPT safety model documentation for the UH-1N aircraft.


D.1 DIAGRAMS

The diagrams illustrating the functional relationships considered in the UH-1N safety model are presented on pages D-5 through D-19, and are listed below:



<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
Propulsion, Diagram B-1	D-5
Propulsion, Diagram B-2	D-6
Propulsion, Diagram B-3	D-7
Comm/Nav/Ident, Diagram C-1	D-8
Comm/Nav/Ident, Diagram C-2	D-9
Information and Displays, Diagram D-1	D-10
Information and Displays, Diagram D-2	D-11
Environmental Control, Diagram E-1	D-12
Environmental Control, Diagram E-2	D-13
Flight Control, Diagram F-1	D-14
Flight Control, Diagram F-2	D-15
Ground Control, Diagram G-1	D-16
Mission Support, Diagram M-1	D-17
Landing Gear, Diagram N-1	D-18
Utilities, Diagram U-1	D-19

D.2 CARD LISTING


Pages D-21 through D-54 are a reproduction of the punchcard listing. The listing is alphabetical by "alpha designator", and the format is that of the 80-column punchcard itself as described in Appendix C. At the top of each page the card columns are printed vertically; for example, column 34 is printed "3".
4




TITLE: PROPOSITION			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
UH-1N	JUNE 78	B-2	




TITLE: PROMULGATION			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
UH-1H	JUNE 76	D-3	




TITLE: COMM NAV IDENT			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
UH-1N	JUNE 76	C-1	




TITLE: INFORMATION & DISPLAYS		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
UH-1H	JUNE 76	D-1




TITLE: COMNAV/NAV/IDENT			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
UH-1H	JUNE 76	C-2	




TITLE: INFORMATION & DISPLAYS			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
UH-1N	JUNE 76	D-3	




TITLE: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
UH-1N	JUNE 78	E-1




TITLE	FLIGHT CONTROL
AIRCRAFT	DATE
UH-1N	JUNE 76
	P-3




TITLE: GROUND CONTROL		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
UH-1N	JUNE 78	G-1



TITLE: MISSION SUPPORT		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
UH-1H	JUNE 78	M-1



TITLE: LANDING GEAR			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
UH-1N	JUNE 76	N-1	



TITLE: UTILITIES			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
UE-1A	JUNE 76	D-1	

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PG6095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777773
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

PG6095.JICC UNJOIN HIN

HIN PROPULSION		B		AAAAAAAAA
HIN ROTOR MAST ROTATION		BAA	B	08AAAAA80
HIN ROTOR MAST ROTATION		BAA	FAA	FAAAAAA8A
HIN MAST ASSY	151G0	BAAA	RAA	1
HIN DUST BOOT	151GA	BAAH	RAA	0
HIN MAST	151GB	BAAC	RAA	A
HIN COVER PLATE	151GC	BAAD	RAA	A
HIN OIL JET	151GD	BAAE	RAA	2
HIN UPPER BEARING	151GE	BAAF	RAA	A
HIN BEARING LINER	151GF	BAAG	RAA	5
HIN LOWER BEARING RACE	151GG	BAAH	RAA	5
HIN POWER TRANSMISSION		BABA	RAA	AAAAAAAAA
HIN POWER TRANSMISSION		BABA	FCF	FAAAAAA80
HIN POWER TRANSMISSION		BARA	LFDC	FAAAAAA8A
HIN POWER TRANSMISSION		BAHA	RFDC	FAAAAAA8A
HIN ROTOR BRAKE ENGAGED		BABB	RAA	000000000
HIN ROTOR BRAKE QUILL	2611E	BABRA	BARH	A
HIN ROTOR BRAKE HOUSING	2611F	BABBB	BARH	0
HIN ROTOR BRAKE LINING	2611G	BABBC	BARH	1
HIN ROTOR BRAKE DISC	2611H	BABBD	BARH	1
HIN ROTOR BRAKE HYD POWER		BABC	BARH	AAAAAAAAA
HIN ROTOR BRAKE HYD SYSTEM	45200	BABCA	BABC	0
HIN MASTER CYLINDER	4521A	BABCB	BABC	8
HIN FILLER PLUG	4521B	BABCC	BABC	1
HIN COUPLING HALF	4521C	BABCD	BABC	3
HIN TRANSMISSION LUBRICATION		BARD	BARA	006686600
HIN INTERNAL FILTER	2612B	BABDA	BARD	1
HIN MANIFOLD	2612C	BABDB	BARD	1
HIN JETS	2612D	BABDC	BARD	1
HIN EXTERNAL FILTER	2612E	BABDD	BARD	1
HIN FILTER ELEMENT	2612F	BABDE	BARD	1
HIN FILLER CAP	2612G	BABDF	BARD	1
HIN SIGHT GAGE	2612J	BABDG	BARD	0
HIN DRAIN VALVE	2612K	BABDH	BARD	1
HIN PRESSURE CONTROL		BAPE	BARD	029AAA920
HIN PUMP	2612A	BABEA	BABE	8
HIN RELIEF VALVE	2612L	BABEB	BABE	1
HIN TEMPERATURE CONTROL		BABF	BABD	000111000
HIN BLOWER SHAFT 2 EACH	22AAL	BABFA	BABF	1
HIN BLOWER SHAFT 2 EA	22AAL	BABFA	BACD	1
HIN BLOWER SHAFT 2 EA	22AAL	BABFA	BAJU	1
HIN COOLER	2612E	BABFB	BABF	1
HIN THERMOSTAT VALVE	2612M	BABFC	BABF	1
HIN BLOWER 2 EACH	22AGU	BABFD	BABF	1
HIN OIL COOLER BLOWER 2 EA	22AGU	BABFD	BACD	1
HIN OIL COOLER BLOWER 2 EA	22AGU	BABFD	BAJD	1
HIN ROTOR BRAKE WARNING		BABG	BABH	111111111
HIN PRESSURE SWITCH	4521C	BABGA	BABG	A
HIN SEGMENT	4432E	BABGH	BABG	A

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

000000000111111112222222223333333344444444555555556666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN LAMP 4432F BAPGJ BACG 4
HIN TRANSMISSION DRIVE BARM BABA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN TRANSMISSION ASSY 26100 BAPHA BAHM 1
HIN TRANSMISSION MOUNT ASSY 26140 BAPHC BAHM 0
HIN BUSHING 2614A BAPHD BAHM 0
HIN FOOT 2614B BAPHE BAHM 0
HIN MOUNT 2614C BAPHF BAHM 8
HIN SPACER PLATE 2614D BAPHG BAHM 1
HIN BOLT 2614E BAPHH BAHM 5
HIN DAMPER 2614F BAPHJ BAHM 1
HIN FIFTH MOUNT 26150 BAPHK BAHM 3
HIN BEARING 2615A BAPHL BAHM 1
HIN BOLT 2615B BAPHM BAHM 3
HIN FOOT 2615C BAHM BAHM 0
HIN ISOLATION MOUNT 2615D BAHM BAHM 1
HIN FITTING 2615E BAHM BAHM 1
HIN ENGINE POWER COMBINED BACA BABA BACE 01712131C
HIN ENGINE POWER COMBINED BACA BABA B 0000A0000
HIN ENGINE POWER COMBINED BACA BABA C 00ACACAC0C
HIN INPUT DRIVE QUILL 2611A BACAV BACA A
HIN COMBINING GEARBOX LUBE BACB BACA 006686600
HIN LUBE SYSTEM 22AGC BACRA BACB 0
HIN ELEMENT OIL FILTER 22AGF BACBB BACB 0
HIN VALVE FILTER BYPASS 22AGH BACBC BACB 1
HIN TANK FILTER AND CAP 22AGM BACBD BACB 1
HIN OIL LEVEL SIGHT GAGE 22AGN BACBE BACB 0
HIN OIL TUBE PRESSURE 22AGS BACBF BACB 1
HIN OIL TUBE BREATHER 22AGO BACBG BACB 1
HIN STATIC CHECK VALVE 22AGR BACBH BACB 1
HIN PRESSURE CONTROL BACC BACB 029AAA920
HIN OIL PUMP 22AGB BACCA BACC A
HIN REGULATOR 22ACG BACCB BACC 8
HIN TEMPERATURE CONTROL BACD BACB 000111000
HIN OIL COOLER 22AGT BACDA BACD 1
HIN AUTOTATION BACF BABA K BACA 00A1111000
HIN INPUT DRIVE QUILL 2611A BACEA BACE A
HIN GEARBOX DRIVE BACF BACA AAAAAA444
HIN REDUCTION GEARBOX SECTION 22AAC BACFA BACF 1
HIN OUTPUT HOUSING 22AAA BACFB BACF 1
HIN DIAPHRAGM 22AAB BACFC BACF 1
HIN INPUT HOUSING 22AAC BACFD BACF 1
HIN 3RD STAGE GEAR 22AAF BACFG BACF A
HIN OUTPUT SHAFT 22AAH BACFJ BACF A
HIN IDLER GEAR 22AAK BACFK BACF A
HIN PADS COVERS 22AAM BACFL BACF 1
HIN OUTPUT CARBON SEAL 22AAN BACFN BACF 1
HIN TACH GENERATOR SEAL 22AAP BACFN BACF 1
HIN MAIN DRIVE SHAFT ASSY 26210 BACFP BACF 1
HIN SHAFT 2621A BACFQ BACF A
HIN COUPLING 2621B BACFR BACF A

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J191 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000111111112222222233333333444444445555555566666666777777777777
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
MIN ADAPTER 2621C BACFS BACF A
MIN ROOT 2621D BACFT BACF J
MIN HOUSING 2621E BACFU BACF 1
MIN SINGLE ENGINE POWER 10F2 BADA BACA 0A81A13A0
MIN VERT TUBE FWD ENG MT 11FCA BATAA BADA A
MIN HORIZ TUBE FWD ENG MT 11FCB BATAB BADA 8
MIN BEARING 11FCC BADAC BADA 1
MIN UPPER FITTING 11FCD BADAQ BADA 8
MIN LOWER FITTING 11FCE BADAQ BADA 8
MIN STOP FITTING 11FCF BADAQ BADA 1
MIN BIPOD ASSY 11FDD BADAG BADA 1
MIN TUBE 11FDA BADAH BADA A
MIN BEARING 11FDB BADAJ BADA 1
MIN FITTING 11FDC BADAK BADA 8
MIN TRIPOD ASSY 11FEO BADAL BADA 1
MIN TURF 11FEA BADAM BADA A
MIN BEARING 11FEE BADAN BADA 1
MIN FITTING 11FEC BADAP BADA 8
MIN INPUT GEARS 1ST STAGE 22AAD HADAQ HADA A
MIN 2ND STAGE GEARS 22AAE BADAR BADA A
MIN CLUTCH GEARSHAFT 22AAG BADAS BADA A
MIN TURBINE ROTATION BAF HADA AAAAAAAAAA
MIN TURBINE ROTATION BAF BAG FAAAAA
MIN TURBINE SECTION 22AEO BAFB BAF 0
MIN COMP TURB VANE RING 22AEB BAFB BAF A
MIN COMP TURB DISC 22AEC BAFB BAF A
MIN COMP TURB BLADE 22AED BAFB BAF A
MIN COMP TURB SHROUD SEGMT 22AEE BAFE BAF 2
MIN INTERSTAGE RAFFLE 22AFF BAF BAF 2
MIN POWER TURBINE VANE RING 22AEG BAFG BAF A
MIN POWER TURBINE SHROUD 22AEH BAFH BAF 2
MIN POWER TURBINE BLADE 22AEJ BAFJ BAF A
MIN POWER TURBINE ROTOR 22AEK BAFK BAF A
MIN POWER TURBINE STATOR HGS 22AEL BAFK BAF A
MIN POWER TURBINE SHAFT HGS 22AEM BAFM BAF A
MIN NO 3 BEARING 22AEN BAFN BAF 8
MIN POWER TURBINE DISC 22AEP BAFB BAF A
MIN NO 4 BEARING 22AEQ BAFQ BAF 8
MIN TURB STUB SHAFT BOLT 22AER BAFR BAF A
MIN NO 3 AND 4 BEARING SUPPORT 22AES BAFS BAF A
MIN COUPLING SHAFT 22AET BAFB BAF A
MIN ACCESSORY DRIVE BAG BADA SAAAAAAAAA
MIN ACCESSORY DRIVE BAG BAN FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ACCESSORY DRIVE BAG BAPR FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ACCESSORY DRIVE BAG BFK FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ACCESSORY DRIVE BAG BFK FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ACCESSORY DRIVE BAG UDG AAAAAAAAAA
MIN ASSY GEARBOX SYS 22ALO HAGA BAG 0
MIN FRT HOUSING CASE 22ALP BAGB BAG 1
MIN COVER HOUSING CASE 22ALC BACC BAG 0

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1P1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000111111111222222223333333333344444444455555555566666666677777777777
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN FIRE SEAL RING 22ALD BAGO BAG 1
HIN INPUT COUPLING SHAFT 22ALE BAGE BAG A
HIN IDLER GEAR SHAFT 22ALF BAGF BAG A
HIN AIR/OIL SEPARATOR 22ALJ BAGG BAG J
HIN BEARING 22ALK BAGH BAG A
HIN CARBON SEAL 22ALL BAGJ BAG 1
HIN PADS COVERS 22ALM BAGL BAG 0
HIN SEAL SHAFT 22ALN BAGM BAG 1
HIN PACKING O-RING 22ALP BAGN BAG 1
HIN LIFTING BRACKET 22ALO BAGP BAG 0
HIN TUBE OIL TRANSFER 22ALS BAGO BAG 8
HIN ENGINE LUBRICATION 22AGC BAJA BAF 000111000
HIN LUBRICATION SYSTEM 22AGC BAJAA BAJA 0
HIN SUPPLY/DISTRIBUTION 22AGC BAJF BAJA AAAAAA
HIN PUMP OIL SCAV NO 2 22AGC BAJBA BAJB 5
HIN PUMP OIL SCAV NO 3/4 BEAR 22AGD BAJBB BAJB 5
HIN PUMP EJECTOR 22AGE BAJBC BAJB 5
HIN ELEMENT OIL FILTER 22AGF BAJBD BAJB 0
HIN VALVE FILTER BYPASS 22AGH BAJBE BAJB 1
HIN TANK FILTER AND CAP 22AGM BAJBF BAJB 1
HIN OIL LEVEL SIGHT GAGE 22AGN BAJBG BAJB 0
HIN OIL TUBE SCAVENGE 22AGP BAJBH BAJB 1
HIN OIL TUBE BREATHER 22AGQ BAJBJ BAJB 0
HIN STATIC CHECK VALVE 22AGK BAJBK BAJB 0
HIN OIL TUBE PRESSURE 22AGS BAJBL BAJB 1
HIN PRESSURE CONTROL 22AGB BAJC BAJA AAAAAA
HIN PUMP OIL PRESSURE 22AGB BAJCA BAJC A
HIN REGULATOR PRESSURE 22AGG BAJCB BAJC 2
HIN TEMPERATURE CONTROL 22AGT BAJD BAJA 11111111
HIN OIL COOLER 22AGT BAJDA BAJD 1
HIN COMBUSTION 22ALD BAL BAF AAAAAA
HIN COMB SECTION 22ALD BAL BAL 0
HIN COMB CHAMBER LINER 22ALD BALB BAL A
HIN GAS GENERATOR CASE 22ALD BALC BAL A
HIN COMB DRAIN VALVE 22ADD BALD BAL 0
HIN OUTER EXIT DUCT 22ADE BALE BAL 1
HIN INNER EXIT DUCT 22ALF BALF BAL 1
HIN COMPRESSION 22ABO BAM BAL AAAAAA
HIN COMPRESSOR SECTION 22ABO BAMA BAM 0
HIN INLET SCREEN 22ABG BAMB BAM 1
HIN INTAKE SCREEN SUPPORT 22ABC BAMC BAM 1
HIN FIRE SEAL RING 22ALD BAMD BAM A
HIN COMP INLET CASE 22ABE BAME BAM 1
HIN COMP IMPOSING 22ABF BAMF BAM 1
HIN LABRYINTH SEAL 22ABG BAMG BAM 1
HIN NO.1 BEARING 22ABH BAMH BAM 8
HIN SPACER 22ABJ BAMJ BAM 8
HIN COMP MOTOR ASSY 22ACU BAMK BAM 0
HIN 1ST ROTOR BLADES 22ACH BAML BAM A
HIN 1ST STATOR VANES 22ACC BAMM BAM A

```


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000011111111222222223333333344444444555555556666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN 2ND ROTOR BLADES	22ACD	BAMN	BAM	A
HIN 2ND STATOR VANES	22ACL	BAMP	BAM	A
HIN 3RD ROTOR BLADES	22ACF	BAMQ	BAM	A
HIN 3RD STATOR VANES	22ACG	BAMR	BAM	A
HIN SPACER	22ACH	BAMS	BAM	8
HIN COMP REAR HUB	22ACJ	BAMT	BAM	A
HIN IMPELLER	22ACK	BAMU	BAM	A
HIN IMPELLER HOUSING	22ACL	BAMV	BAM	A
HIN COMP TIE ROD	22ACN	BAMW	BAM	A
HIN VANE KING	22ACP	BAMX	BAM	A
HIN NO 2 LEADING	22ACQ	BAMY	BAM	8
HIN AIR ROTOR SEAL	22ACP	BAMZ	BAM	1
HIN COMPRESSOR BLEED VALVE	22AKD	JAMZA	BAM	1
HIN IGNITION/START		BAN	BAL	T 000AAAC00
HIN IGNITION AND ELECT SYSTEM	22AJG	BANA	BAN	0
HIN IGN EXCITOR BOX	22AJB	BANB	BAN	A
HIN PLUG IGNITOR 2 EACH	22AJC	BANC	BAN	2
HIN IGNITION HARNESS	22AJE	BAND	BAN	5
HIN STARTER GENERATOR	4211K	BANE	BAN	A
HIN START GEN CONT RELAY	4211T	BANF	BAN	A
HIN SHUNT CONT RELAY	4211U	BANG	BAN	A
HIN ENGINE START SWITCH	9942A	BANH	BAN	A
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4221G	BANJ	BAN	1
HIN STARTER GEARSHAFT	22ALG	BANK	BAN	A
HIN FLOW DIVIDER	22AHS	BANL	BAN	8
HIN FUEL DELIVERED		BAPA	BAL	AAAAAAAAA
HIN FUEL MANIFOLD ASSY	22AHK	BAPAA	BAPA	A
HIN TUBE PRIMARY	22AHL	BAPAB	BAPA	A
HIN TUBE SECONDARY	22AHM	BAPAC	BAPA	1
HIN FUEL NOZZLE	22AHN	BAPAD	BAPA	1
HIN FUEL TUBE PRESSURE	22AHQ	BAPAE	BAPA	A
HIN FUEL PRESSURIZED		BAPB	BAPA	AAAAAAAAA
HIN FUEL PUMP	22AHD	BAPBA	BAPB	A
HIN FILTER FUEL ELEMENT	22AHE	BAPBB	BAPB	1
HIN FUEL PUMP GEARSHAFT	22ALH	BAPBC	BAPB	A
HIN FUEL FLOW CONTROLLED		BAPC	BAPA	AAAAAAAAA
HIN FUEL SYSTEM	22AHO	BAPCA	BAPC	0
HIN AUTO MODE		BAPD	BAPC	BAPE 11111111
HIN FUEL CONTROL AUTO	22AHR	BAPDA	BAPD	8
HIN REGULATOR VALVE	22AHF	BAPDR	BAPD	8
HIN BYPASS VALVE	22AHG	BAPDC	BAPD	5
HIN TRANSFER VALVE MFC	22AHH	BAPDD	BAPD	1
HIN TTS THERMOCOUPLE DELET	22AJD	BAPDE	BAPD	0
HIN TTS SENSING HARNESS DELET	22AJF	BAPDF	BAPD	0
HIN TTS LIMITER	22AJG	BAPDG	BAPD	0
HIN PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	22AKG	BAPDH	BAPD	0
HIN GOVERNOR NG	22AHJ	BAPDJ	BAPD	A
HIN AIR TUBE P3 PRESSURE	22AKB	BAPDK	BAPD	8
HIN TUBE COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE	22AKE	BAPDL	BAPD	8
HIN MANUAL MODE		BAPE	BAPC	K RAPD AAAAAAAAAA

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

[illegible]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN DRAIN VALVE	4621J	BBCJ	BBC	1
HIN VENT VALVE	4621K	BBCK	BBC	1
HIN CHECK VALVE	4621L	BBCL	BBC	0
HIN STUD	4621C	BBCM	BBC	0
HIN AUX FUEL CONTROL	4622G	BBCN	BBC	0
HIN TRANSFER PUMP SWITCH	4622A	BBCP	BBC	5
HIN TRANSFER RELAY	4622B	BBCQ	BBC	5
HIN AUX FUEL LOW SWITCH	4622C	BBCR	BBC	0
HIN UPPER FLOAT SWITCH	4622D	BBCS	BBC	0
HIN LOWER FLOAT SWITCH	4622E	BBCU	BBC	1
HIN AUX FUEL HOLDING RELAY	4622F	BBCU	BBC	0
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4622G	BBCV	BBC	1
HIN PRESSURIZATION		BBD	BB	11111111
HIN NORMAL BOOST		BBD	BBF	11111111
HIN NORMAL BOOST		BBD	BBG	FAAAAAAAAA
HIN BOOST PUMP	4611E	BBD	BBE	A
HIN FUEL BOOST CKT BKR	4614B	BBD	BBE	1
HIN CROSSFEED BOOST		BBD	K BBE	AAAAAAAAA
HIN BOOST PUMP	4611E	BBD	BBF	A
HIN CROSSFEED SWITCH	4614C	BBD	BBF	A
HIN INTERCONNECT VALVE	4612C	BBD	BBF	A
HIN FUEL CROSSFEED CKT BKR	4614B	BBD	BBF	1
HIN FUEL BOOST CKT BKR	4614B	BBD	BBF	1
HIN BOOST PUMP FAIL WRNG		BBD	BBF	11111111
HIN FLOW SWITCH	4611F	BBD	BBG	A
HIN SEGMENT	4432E	BBD	BBG	A
HIN LAMP	4432F	BBD	BBG	A
HIN FUEL SUPPLY STATUS		BBD	I BBR	11111111
HIN FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION		BBD	BBK	11111111
HIN INSTRUMENTS	4613G	BBD	BBJ	0
HIN PROBE TANK UNIT 3 EACH	4613A	BBD	BBJ	8
HIN COMPENSATOR	4613B	BBD	BBJ	1
HIN QUANTITY INDICATOR	4613C	BBD	BBJ	8
HIN COUPLER	4613D	BBD	BBJ	8
HIN TEST SWITCH	4613E	BBD	BBJ	0
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4613F	BBD	BBJ	1
HIN LOW LEVEL WARNING		BBD	K BBJ	AAAAAAAAA
HIN FLOAT SWITCH	4611Q	BBD	BBK	A
HIN SEGMENT	4432E	BBD	BBK	A
HIN LAMP	4432F	BBD	BBK	A
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432G	BBD	BABG	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432H	BBD	BBG	1
HIN 2CAUTION PANEL	4432I	BBD	BBK	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432J	BBD	BDD	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432K	BBD	BEG	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432L	BBD	BCH	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432M	BBD	BED	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432N	BBD	BEF	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432O	BBD	BEG	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	4432P	BBD	BFD	1

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG005.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111111222222222333333333344444444455555555566666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN CAUTION PANEL	44320	BCAB	BFQ	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	44320	BCAB	BFR	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	44320	BCAB	FCF	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	44320	BCAB	LFDD	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	44320	BCAB	RFDD	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	44320	BCAB	UAF	1
HIN CAUTION PANEL	44320	BCAB	UDJ	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	PARG	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BEG	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BBK	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BDD	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BGG	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BHH	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BED	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BEF	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BEG	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BFD	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BFQ	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	BFR	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	FCF	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	LFDD	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	RFDD	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	UAF	1
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT-DIM	44320	BCAC	UDJ	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BARG	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BEG	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BBK	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BDD	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BGG	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BHH	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BED	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BEF	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BEG	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BFD	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BFQ	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	BFR	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	FCF	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	LFDD	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	RFDD	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	UAF	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	44320	BCAD	UDJ	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BARG	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BEG	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BBK	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BDD	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BGG	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BHH	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BED	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BEF	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BEG	1

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PG0095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

000000000111111111122222222223333333334444444444455555555555666666666777777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BFO	1	
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BFO	1	
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	BFR	1	
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	FCF	1	
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	LFLO	1	
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	RFD0	1	
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAE	UAF	1	
HIN DIMMING DIODE	44320	BCAL	UDJ	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BABG	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BRG	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	HBK	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	RUD	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BDG	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BDH	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BED	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BFF	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BEG	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BFD	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BFO	1	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4432G	BCAF	BFR	1	
HIN CKT BKR	4432G	BCAF	FCF	1	
HIN CKT BKR	4432G	BCAF	LFDD	1	
HIN CKT BKR	4432G	BCAF	RFD0	1	
HIN CKT BKR	4432G	BCAF	UAF	1	
HIN CKT BKR	4432G	BCAF	UDJ	1	
HIN ROTOR RPM STATUS		BCB	BACE		AAAAAAAAA
HIN ROTOR RPM STATUS		BCB	BAPE		AAAAAAAAA
HIN TACH GENERATOR	2613E	BCBA	BCB	A	
HIN TACH QUILL	2611C	BCBB	PCB	A	
HIN ROTOR RPM INDICATION		BCC	RCB	BCD	11111111
HIN TRIPLE TACH INDICATOR	2613F	HCCA	BCC	8	
HIN ROTOR RPM WARNING		BCD	BCB	K BCC	AAAAAAAAA
HIN RPM WARNING LIGHT	2613H	BCDA	BCD	1	
HIN RPM WARNING LIGHT	2613H	BCDA	BFL	A	
HIN RPM AUDIO SWITCH	2613L	BCDB	PCD	1	
HIN RPM WARNING SYSTEM		BCE	BCD		AAAAAAAAA
HIN RPM WARNING SYSTEM		BCE	BFL		FAAAAAAAAAA
HIN RPM WARNING DETECTOR	2613J	BCFA	PCE	A	
HIN RPM WARNING BOX	2613K	BCFR	BCE	A	
HIN XMISSION OIL STATUS		BDA	BARA		AAAAAAAAA
HIN XMISSION OIL PRESSURE		BDB	BDA	I BABE	AAAAAAAAA
HIN XMISSION OIL PRES IND		BDC	BDB		11111111
HIN INDICATOR	2613A	BDDA	BDC	8	
HIN TRANSMITTER	2613B	BDCB	BDC	A	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	2613G	BDDC	BDC	1	
HIN XMISSION OIL PRES WARNING		BDD	BDB		11111111
HIN OIL PRESSURE SWITCH	2613Q	BDDA	BDD	A	
HIN SEGMENT	4432E	BDDR	BDD	A	
HIN LAMP	4432F	BDDC	BDD	A	
HIN TRANSMISSION OIL TEMP		BDE	BDA	I BABF	AAAAAAAAA

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000011111111122222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN XMISSION OIL TEMP IND                                BOF                                BOC                                11111111
HIN INDICATOR                                           2613A                                BOFA                                BOF                                8
HIN OIL TEMP BULB                                       2613D                                BOFB                                BOF                                A
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER                                     2613G                                BOFC                                BOF                                1
HIN XMISSION OIL TEMP WARN                             BOG                                BOE                                11111111
HIN OIL TEMP SWITCH                                   2613K                                BOGA                                BOG                                A
HIN SEGMENT                                             4432F                                BOGB                                BOG                                1
HIN LAMP                                                4432F                                BOGC                                BOG                                1
HIN TRANSMISSION CHIP DETECT                           BOH                                BABA                                I BABH                                AAAAAAAAAA
HIN CHIP DETECTOR                                       2613M                                BOHA                                BOH                                A
HIN CHIP DETECTOR LIGHT                               2613N                                BOHB                                BOH                                A
HIN LAMP                                                2613P                                BOHC                                BOH                                A
HIN SEGMENT                                             4432E                                BOHD                                BOH                                1
HIN LAMP                                                4432F                                BOHE                                BOH                                1
HIN COMBIN GEARBOX OIL STATUS                           BEA                                BACA                                AAAAAAAAAA
HIN COMBIN GEARBOX PRESSURE                           BEB                                BEA                                I BACC                                AAAAAAAAAA
HIN COMBIN GEARBOX PRES IND                           BEC                                BEB                                11111111
HIN OIL PRESSURE INDICATOR                             22EAC                                BECA                                BEC                                A
HIN OIL PRESSURE XMITTER                               22EAJ                                BECB                                BEC                                A
HIN CBOX OIL PRESS CKT BKR                             4241C                                BECC                                BEC                                1
HIN COMBIN GEARBOX PRES WARN                           BED                                BEB                                11111111
HIN PRESSURE TRANSDUCER                                22AGJ                                BEDA                                BED                                A
HIN SEGMENT                                             4432E                                BEDB                                BED                                A
HIN LAMP                                                4432F                                BEDC                                BED                                A
HIN COMBIN GEARBOX TEMPERATURE                         BEE                                BEA                                I BACD                                AAAAAAAAAA
HIN TEMPERATURE INDICATOR                             22BAC                                BEEA                                BEE                                8
HIN OIL TEMP THERMOCOUPLE                             22AGK                                BEEB                                BEE                                A
HIN C BOX OIL TEMP CKT BKR                             4241C                                BEEC                                BEE                                1
HIN FILTER BYPASS WARNING                             BEF                                BEA                                000000000
HIN BYPASS PRESSURE SWITCH                             5922A                                BEFA                                BEF                                A
HIN SEGMENT                                             4432E                                BEFB                                BEF                                A
HIN LAMP                                                4432F                                BEFC                                BEF                                A
HIN COMBIN GEARBOX CHIP DETECT                         BEG                                BACA                                I BACF                                AAAAAAAAAA
HIN CHIP DETECTOR                                       22AGL                                BEGA                                BEG                                A
HIN CHIP DETECTOR LIGHT                               22AGV                                BEGB                                BEG                                A
HIN LAMP                                                22AGW                                BEGC                                BEG                                A
HIN SEGMENT                                             4432E                                BEGD                                BEG                                1
HIN LAMP                                                4432F                                BEGE                                BEG                                1
HIN ENGINE STATUS                                       BF                                BAUA                                AAAAAAAAAA
HIN OIL STATUS                                           BFA                                BF                                11111111
HIN OIL PRESSURE                                         BFB                                BFA                                I BAJC                                AAAAAAAAAA
HIN OIL PRESSURE INDICATION                           BFC                                BFB                                11111111
HIN OIL PRESSURE XMITTER                               22BAJ                                BFCA                                BFC                                A
HIN OIL PRESSURE INDICATOR                             22EAC                                BFCB                                BFC                                A
HIN OIL PRESSURE CKT BKR                             4241C                                BFCC                                BFC                                1
HIN OIL PRESSURE WARNING                                BFD                                BFB                                11111111
HIN OIL PRESSURE TRANSDUCER                             22AGJ                                BFDA                                BFD                                A
HIN SEGMENT                                             4432E                                BFDB                                BFD                                A
HIN LAMP                                                4432F                                BFDC                                BFD                                A
HIN OIL TEMPERATURE                                    BFE                                BFA                                I BAJD                                AAAAAAAAAA

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000011111111122222222233333333344444444455555555566666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN TEMPERATURE INDICATOR 22AAC BFFA BFF 8
HIN OIL TEMP THERMOCOUPLE 22AGK BFFB BFF A
HIN OIL TEMP CKT BKR 4221G BFFC BFF 1
HIN ENGINE TORQUE 3FF I BAPG 111111111
HIN TORQUE XMITTER 22FAA BFFA BFF A
HIN DUAL TORQUE INDICATOR 22EAB BFFB BFF 8
HIN TORQUE PRESS CKT BKR 4241C BFFC BFF 1
HIN ENGINE SPEED BFG BF T AAAAAAAAAA
HIN TURBINE RPM BFH BFG 111111111
HIN TACH GENERATOR 22FAF BFHA BFH A
HIN TRIPLE TACH INDICATOR 2613F BFHB BFH 1
HIN TACH GENERATOR GEARSHAFT 22ALR BFHC BFH A
HIN GAS PRODUCER RPM BFJ BFG AAAAAAAAAA
HIN RPM INDICATION BFK BFJ 111111111
HIN TACH GENERATOR 22FAF BFKA BFK A
HIN TACH INDICATOR 22BAG BFKB BFK 1
HIN TACH GEARSHAFT 22ALR BFKC BFK A
HIN RPM WARNING BFL BFJ 111111111
HIN INTERTURBINE TEMPERATURE BFM BF T 111111111
HIN ITT INDICATOR 22BAH BFMA BFM A
HIN ITT THERMOCOUPLE 9922B BFMB BFM A
HIN INJET TEMP CKT BKR 4241C BFMC BFM 1
HIN ENGINE FUEL STATUS BFN BF 111111111
HIN FUEL FLOW RATE BFP BFN 000000000
HIN FUEL FLOW XMITTER 22BAU BFPA BFP A
HIN FUEL FLOW INDICATOR 22FAE BFPB BFP 8
HIN FUEL FLOW CKT BKR 4241C BFPC BFP 1
HIN FUEL FILTER WARNING BFQ BFN 000000000
HIN BYPASS SWITCH 4612K BFQA BFQ A
HIN SEGMENT 4432E BFQB BFQ A
HIN LAMP 4432F BFQC BFQ A
HIN ENGINE CHIP DETECTION 3FR BF 111111111
HIN CHIP DETECTOR 22AGL BFER BFR A
HIN SEGMENT 4432E BFRB BFR A
HIN LAMP 4432F BFER BFR A
HIN COMM/NAV/IDENT C C AAAAAAAAAA
HIN COMMUNICATION CA C E 001111200
HIN COMM ATTENUATION CAA CA 111111111
HIN SECURE COMMUNICATION CAB CAA 000000000
HIN COMM SECURE SET-TSEC/KY2R 6221G CAB CA 8
HIN INDICATOR C-8157/ARC 6221A CAB CA 9
HIN MOUNT MT-3802/ARC 6221B CAB CA 0
HIN EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION CAC CAA 111111111
HIN REDUNDANCY ATTENUATION CACA CAC 111111111
HIN UHF COMMUNICATION CAD CACA 111111111
HIN RADIO SET AN/ARC-116 63111 CADA CAD 8
HIN ANTENNA UHF AT-110R/ARC 6231H CAD CA 8
HIN VHF-AM COMMUNICATION CAE CACA 111111111
HIN VHF COMM SYSTEM FMC 6231G CAE CA 0
HIN RADIO SET AN/ARC-115 6231A CAEB CAE 8

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PG0095.JJRI DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

0000000001111111112222222222333333333444444444455555555566666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN ANTENNA VHF AT-1104/ARC 62318 CAEC CAE 8
HIN VHF-FM COMMUNICATION CAF CACA 111111111
HIN VHF COMM SYSTEM REMC 62100 CAFA CAF 0
HIN RADIO SET AN/ARC-114 6211A CAER CAF 8
HIN FILTER 6211C CAFC CAF 1
HIN ANTENNA AS-1703/ARC 6211D CAFD CAF 8
HIN ANTENNA COUPLER 6211E CAFE CAF 8
HIN HF COMMUNICATION CAG CACA 111111111
HIN REC/XMITTER RT-698/ARC102 61111 CAGA CAG 8
HIN MOUNT MT-3772A/A 61112 CAGH CAG 0
HIN INVERTER PP-3702/ARC102 61113 CAGC CAG 4
HIN CONTROL C-3940/ARC94 61114 CAGD CAG 8
HIN ANTENNA 61115 CAGE CAG 8
HIN ANTENNA COUPLER CU-1658/A 61116 CAGF CAG 9
HIN INTERNAL COMMUNICATION CAH CAA 000000000
HIN INTERNAL COMMUNICATION CAH CCM F111111111
HIN AIRCREW COMMUNICATION CAJ CAC 111111111
HIN AIRCREW COMMUNICATION CAJ CAH 111111111
HIN PILOT COMM CONTROL CAK CAJ 111111111
HIN PILOT COMM CONTROL CAK CAJ H AAAAAAAAAA
HIN CONTROL PANEL C-6533/ARC 6411A CAKA CAK 8
HIN CORD XF-14/U 6411B CAKB CAK 8
HIN PLUG U-92A/U 6411C CAKC CAK 8
HIN CORD XY-85/U 6411D CAKD CAK 9
HIN PLUG U-94A/U 6411E CAKE CAK 8
HIN HEADSET 6411F CAKF CAK 1
HIN FOOT SWITCH 6411G CAKG CAK 1
HIN HOT MIKE SWITCH 6411H CAKH CAK 0
HIN MIKE SWITCH ROYCLICK 6411J CAKJ CAK 1
HIN FLIGHT CREW COMM CAL CAC 111111111
HIN FLIGHT CREW COMM CAL CAH 000000000
HIN CONTROL PANEL 2 EACH 6411A CALA CAL 1
HIN CORD XF-14/U 2 EACH 6411B CALB CAL 1
HIN PLUG U-92A/U 2 EACH 6411C CALC CAL 1
HIN CORD XY-85/U 2 EACH 6411D CALD CAL 1
HIN PLUG U-94A/U 2 EACH 6411E CALF CAL 1
HIN HEADSET 4 EACH 6411F CALF CAL 1
HIN FOOT SWITCH 2 EACH 6411G CALG CAL 1
HIN HOT MIKE SWITCH 2 EACH 6411H CALH CAL 0
HIN IDENTIFICATION CB C 000000000
HIN IFF XPONDER AN/APX-72 65110 CBA CB 0
HIN RECEIVER XMITTER RT-659 6511A CBB CB 8
HIN MOUNTING MT-3809/APX-72 6511B CBC CB 0
HIN CONTROL UNIT C-6280P/APX 6511C CBD CB 8
HIN ANTENNA AT-741/A 6511D CBE CB 8
HIN ALTIMETER ENCODER 6511E CBF CB 1
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 6511F CBG CB 1
HIN IFF TEST EQUIPMENT 65210 CBH CB 0
HIN XPONDER TEST SET TS-1343 6521A CNJ CB 0
HIN MOUNTING MT-3513/APX 6521B CBK CB 0

```


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGC095.J131 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000111111112222222233333333334444444455555555666666667777777777
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN MARK XII COMPUTER KIT 14/ 65210 CBL CH 0
HIN NAVIGATION CC C E C00122200
HIN DEAD RECKONING CCA CC K C00 AAAAAAAAAA
HIN HEADING CCB CCA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN STANDBY COMPASS 51220 CCBA CCB 0
HIN COMPASS 5122A CCB8 CCB A
HIN CORRECTION CARD HOLDER 5122B CCRC CCB 0
HIN TIME CCC CCA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN CLOCK 5131B CCCA CCC 0
HIN NAV AIDS CCB CC 000555300
HIN NAV DISPLAYS CCE CCD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN RANGE CCF CCE 111111111
HIN INDICATOR BOHI 2 EACH 7111E CCFA CCF 1
HIN HEARING CCG CCE 888888888
HIN INDICATOR BOHI 2 EACH 7111E CCGA CCG 1
HIN COURSE CCH CCE 555555555
HIN COURSE INDICATOR 2 EACH 6211B CCHA CCH 1
HIN MARKER BEACON LITE CCJ CCE 000000100
HIN INDICATOR 2 EACH 7151E CCJA CCJ 1
HIN HEADING CCK CCE 889888888
HIN BOHI CCKA CCK 111111111
HIN INDICATOR BOHI 2 EACH 7111E CCKAA CCKA 1
HIN COURSE INDICATOR CCKB CCK 111111111
HIN COURSE INDICATOR 2 EACH 6211B CCKBA CCKB 1
HIN NAV ELECTRONICS CCL CCD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN MARKER BEACON CCM CCP 000000100
HIN MARKER BEACON R-1041/ARN 7151D CCMA CCM 0
HIN RECEIVER R-1041/ARN 7151A CCM8 CCM 8
HIN ANTENNA AT-64C/ARN 7151B CCMC CCM 8
HIN CONTROL SWITCH 7151C CCMO CCM A
HIN SENSING SWITCH 7151D CCME CCM A
HIN GYRO COMPASS CCN CCL 888888888
HIN GYRO MAG COMPASS AN/ASN43 5121D CCNA CCN 0
HIN DIRECTIONAL GYRO CN-398 5121A CCNB CCN A
HIN AMITTER T611/ASN 5121B CCNC CCN A
HIN COMPENSATOR CN-405/ASN 5121C CCND CCN 8
HIN COMPASS MAG-06 SWITCH 5121D CCNE CCN 5
HIN COMPASS CONTROLLER C6347 5121E CCNF CCN 8
HIN ELECT CONT 44P AN-6015A 5121F CCNG CCN 8
HIN VOR/TAC CCP CCL 111111111
HIN VOR CCPA CCP 111111111
HIN VOR AN/ARN-92 7131C CCPAA CCPA 0
HIN RECEIVER RADIO R-1234 7131A CCPAB CCPA 8
HIN CONTROL UNIT C-6873 7131B CCPAC CCPA 8
HIN ANTENNA AS-1304 AN-4-4C 7131C CCPAD CCPA 8
HIN ANTENNA AN-4-4 AS-1304C 7131D CCPAE CCPA 8
HIN MOUNTING MT-3600 7131F CCPAF CCPA 0
HIN ANTENNA FM HOMING 6211F CCPAG CCPA 8
HIN TACAN CCPH CCP 111111111
HIN TACAN AN/ARN-65 7121D CCPBA CCPB 0

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JMRL DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111122222222233333333344444444455555555566666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN CONTROL C-1753/ARN-21A	7121A	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN REC/XMITTER RT-471/ARN-65	7121B	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN MOUNTING MT-2091/ARN-65	7121C	CCPB	CCPB	0
HIN ANTENNA AT-741/A	7121D	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN CHANNEL SELECTOR SERVO	7121E	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN VIDEO DECODER	7121F	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN AZ GATE	7121H	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN AZ CONTROL	7121J	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN RANGE GATE	7121K	CCPB	CCPB	1
HIN RANGE CONTROL	7121L	CCPB	CCPB	1
HIN IF AMPLIFIER	7121M	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN PHASE DETECTOR	7121N	CCPB	CCPB	9
HIN AZ COUPLER	7121P	CCPB	CCPB	8
HIN RANGE COUPLER	7121Q	CCPB	CCPB	1
HIN DIRECTION FINDING		CCR	CCL	111111000
HIN ADF		CCRA	CCR	111111111
HIN ADF AIN/ARN-R9	7141Q	CCRAA	CCRA	0
HIN RECEIVER RADIO R-1495	7141A	CCRA	CCRA	8
HIN CONTROL UNIT C-7302	7141B	CCRA	CCRA	8
HIN AMPLIFIER AM-4859/ARN-69	7141C	CCRA	CCRA	9
HIN ANTENNA LOOP AS-2103	7141D	CCRA	CCRA	9
HIN ANTENNA SENSE	7141E	CCRA	CCRA	8
HIN UHF-DF		CCRB	CCB	111111111
HIN UHF DF AN/ARA 50	7111Q	CCRB	CCRB	0
HIN ANTENNA AS-909/ARA48	7111A	CCRB	CCRB	8
HIN AMP AM-3624/ARA 50	7111B	CCRB	CCRB	8
HIN PRE-AMP AM-3969/AR	7111C	CCRB	CCRB	8
HIN MOUNT MT-1955/ARA 50	7111D	CCRB	CCRB	0
HIN RADIO SET AM/ARC-116	63111	CCRB	CCRB	8
HIN INFORMATION AND DISPLAYS		D		AAAAAAAAA
HIN WARNING INFORMATION		DAA	D	AAAAAAAAA
HIN MASTER CAUTION		DAB	DAA	000000000
HIN MASTER CAUTION LIGHT	4431C	DAB	DAB	0
HIN LIGHT ASSEMBLY	4431A	DAB	DAB	8
HIN RESET SWITCH	4431B	DAB	DAB	1
HIN DIMMING RESISTOR	4431C	DAB	DAB	1
HIN DIMMING DIODE	4431D	DAB	DAB	1
HIN LAMP	4431E	DAB	DAB	A
HIN PAX WING HORN		DAC	DAA	000000000
HIN PAX ALARM HORN	9121Q	DAC	DAC	0
HIN HORN	9121A	DAC	DAC	8
HIN SWITCH	9121B	DAC	DAC	5
HIN SWITCH GUARD	9121C	DAC	DAC	0
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	9121D	DAC	DAC	1
HIN ENGINE FIRE EXTINGUISHER		DAU	DAU	X
HIN ENG FIRE EXTINGUISHER	9111C	DAU	DAU	0
HIN SELECTOR SWITCH	9111A	DAU	DAU	5
HIN EMERGENCY SWITCH	9111C	DAU	DAU	A
HIN PULL HANDLE	9111D	DAU	DAU	A
HIN RELAY	9111E	DAU	DAU	A

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

0000000001111111112222222233333333344444444445555555556666666667777777779
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN TUBE 9111G DADF DAD 8
HIN MANIFOLD 9111J DAUG DAD 1
HIN ENGINE FIRE WARNING 9111A DAL DAD 111111111
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4911A DAEA DAE A
HIN LAMP 4911G DAER DAE A
HIN RESERVE FIRE EXTINGUISH 9111B DAF DAD K DAD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 9111B DAFA DAF 1
HIN FIRE EXT CONTAINER 9111F DAFB DAF 1
HIN MOUNT 9111H DAFC DAF 0
HIN INDICATOR DISC 9111K DAFO DAF 0
HIN FIRE EXT SWITCH 9711A DAFE DAF A
HIN ENGINE FIRE DETECTION 9111B DAG DAE AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ENGINE FIRE DETECTION 9111B DAG DAF AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ENG FIRE DETECT SYSTEM 4911G DAGA DAG 0
HIN AMPLIFIER 4911B DAGB DAG 8
HIN TEST SWITCH 4911C DAGC DAG 0
HIN RESISTOR 4911D DAGD DAG A
HIN ELEMENT 4911E DAGE DAG A
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 4911F DAGF DAG 1
HIN MAIN FIRE EXTINGUISH 9111B DAH DAD DAF 111111111
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 9111B DAHA DAH 1
HIN FIRE EXT CONTAINER 9111F DAHB DAH 1
HIN MOUNT 9111H DAHC DAH 0
HIN INDICATOR DISC 9111K DAHD DAH C
HIN FIRE EXT SWITCH 9711A DAHE DAH A
HIN FLIGHT STATUS 5131A DBA D 001121200
HIN OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 5131A DBB DRA 000000000
HIN FREE AIR TEMP IND 5131A DBB DBP 8
HIN ATTITUDE 5131A DBB DBA E 001151700
HIN PITCH/ROLL 5131A DBB DBB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN PILOTS IND 5131A DBB DBB 111111111
HIN PILOTS IND 5131A DBB DBB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ATTITUDE INDICATOR 5111F DBBA DBB 8
HIN RATE SWITCHING GYRO 5111F DBBB DBB A
HIN ROLL/PITCH DISPLACE GYRO 5111G DBBC DBB A
HIN PHASE ADAPTER 5111J DBBD DBB A
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 4241C DBBE DBB 1
HIN TURN/SLIP 5111D DBB DBB K DBCA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN PILOTS IND 5111D DBB DBB DBB 111111111
HIN PILOTS IND 5111D DBB DBB DBB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN TURN AND SLIP IND 5111D DBB DBB DBB 5
HIN AIRSPEED 5111D DBB DBB DBB 001000300
HIN AIRSPEED 5111D DBB DBB DBB 000000000
HIN PILOTS IND 5111D DBB DBB DBB 111111111
HIN PILOTS IND 5111D DBB DBB DBB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN AIRSPEED INDICATOR 5111A DBB DBB DBB 8
HIN PITOT SENSE AND DIST 5111A DBB DBB DBB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN PITOT STATIC SYST 5112D DBB DBB DBB 0
HIN PITOT TUBE 5112A DBB DBB DBB A
HIN PITOT HEATER 5112C DBB DBB DBB 1

```


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGC095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000011111111122222222233333333344444444555555556666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN HEATER SWITCH 5112D DBDHD DBDH 1
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 5112E DBDDE DBDH 1
HIN MANIFOLD 5112F DBDHF DBDH 1
HIN DRAIN 5112G DBDBG DBDH 1
HIN ALTITUDE DBE DBA E 0004444400
HIN BAROMETRIC IND DBEA DBF DBEC 111111111
HIN PILOTS IND DBEH DBEA 111111111
HIN PILOTS IND DBEH DBEA H 888888888
HIN ALTIMETER IND 5111B DBEHA DBEH A
HIN RADAR ALT IND DBEC DBE K DBEA 888888888
HIN RADAR ALT AN/APN-171 7211G DBECA DBEC 0
HIN REC-XMIT RT-804/APN-171 7211A DBECH DBEC 8
HIN ANTENNA AS-1858/APN-171 7211B DBECC DBEC 8
HIN MOUNTING BASE 7211D DBECE DBEC 1
HIN CRYSTAL TUNNET 7212F DBECF DBEC 8
HIN PILOTS IND DBEH DBEC 111111111
HIN PILOTS IND DBEH DBEC H 888888888
HIN INDICATOR HEIGHT 10-1345 7211C DBEED DBED A
HIN VERT VEL IND DBEF DBE K DBCA 888888888
HIN PILOTS IND DBEH DBEF 111111111
HIN PILOTS IND DBEH DBEF H 888888888
HIN RATE OF CLIMB IND 5111C DBEGA DBEG A
HIN STATIC SENSE DBEH DBD 888888888
HIN STATIC SENSE DBEH DBEA 888888888
HIN STATIC SENSE DBEH DBEF 888888888
HIN STATIC PORT 5112B DBEHA DBEH 1
HIN AIRSPEED ATTN DBX DBA 111111111
HIN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL E DBE D 888888888
HIN LIGHTING EAA DBE 011111210
HIN INTERNAL LIGHTING EAA DBE 111111111
HIN NORMAL LIGHTING EAB DBE 111111111
HIN INSTRUMENT LIGHTING NORMAL EAC DBE 111111111
HIN PILOTS INSTRUMENTS EAD DBE 111111111
HIN COPILOTS INSTRUMENTS EAD DBE H 888888888
HIN INST PANEL LIGHTS 4412D EADA EAD 0
HIN POWER SUPPLY 4412A EADB EAD 8
HIN CONTROL 4412B EADC EAD 8
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 4412C EADD EAD 8
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4412D EADE EAD 1
HIN LAMP 4412E EADF EAD 1
HIN ENGINE INSTRUMENT EAF EAC 888888888
HIN INST PANEL LIGHTS 4412D EAF EAF 0
HIN POWER SUPPLY 4412A EAF EAF 8
HIN CONTROL 4412B EAF EAF 8
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 4412C EAF EAF 8
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4412D EAF EAF 1
HIN LAMP 4412E EAF EAF 1
HIN OVERHEAD CONSOLE EAG EAF 111111111
HIN OVERHEAD CONSOLE LIGHTS 4415D EAG EAG 0
HIN CONTROL 4415A EAG EAG 8

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

000000001111111112222222223333333334444444445555555556666666667777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN TRANSISTOR 4415B EAGC FAG 8
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 4415C EAGD EAG 8
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4415D EAGE EAG 1
HIN LAMP 4415E EAGF EAG 1
HIN PEDESTAL LIGHTING EAH FAR 111111111
HIN PEDESTAL LIGHTS 4414D EAH A EAH 0
HIN CONTROL 4414A EAHB EAH 3
HIN TRANSISTOR 4414B EAH C EAH 8
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 4414C EAH D EAH 8
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4414D EAH E EAH 1
HIN LAMP 4414E EAH F EAH 1
HIN RACKUP LIGHTING EAJ EAA K EAB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN DOME LIGHTS EAK EAJ 111111111
HIN DOME LIGHTS 4111D EAKA EAK 0
HIN RHEUSTAT 4111A EAKB EAK 8
HIN SELECTOR SWITCH 4111B EAKC EAK 4
HIN CKT BRK 4111C EAKD EAK 8
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4111D EAKE EAK 2
HIN LAMP 4111E EAKF EAK 2
HIN UTILITY LIGHTS EAJ 111111111
HIN UTILITY LIGHTS 4416D EAL EAL 0
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4416A EALB EAL 5
HIN LAMP 4416B EALC EAL 5
HIN CKT BRK 4416C EALD EAL 8
HIN INSTRUMENT SECONDARY EAM EAD K EAC AAAAAAAAAA
HIN INST SECONDARY LIGHTS 4413D EAMA EAM 0
HIN CONTROL 4413A EAMB EAM A
HIN TRANSISTOR 4413B EAMC EAM 8
HIN CKT BRK 4413C EAMD EAM 8
HIN LAMP 4413E EAME EAM 1
HIN INSPECTION LIGHTING EAN EAR 000000000
HIN SPARE LAMPS 44411 EANA EAN 0
HIN TRANS OIL LEVEL INSP LIGHT 4442C EANB EAN 0
HIN LIGHT 44421 EANC EAN 8
HIN LAMP 44422 EAND EAN A
HIN SWITCH 44423 EANE EAN A
HIN CKT BRK 44424 EANF EAN 8
HIN EXTERNAL LIGHTING EAP EA 111111111
HIN EXT LIGHT ATTENUATION EAO EAP 111111111
HIN NAVIGATION LIGHTS EAR EAO 000000000
HIN NAV LIGHTS 4421D EARA EAR 0
HIN SWITCH STDY-OFF-ON 4421A EARB EAR 5
HIN SWITCH BRIGHT DIM 4421B EARC EAR 5
HIN LIGHT ASSY 6 FA 4421C EARD EAR 1
HIN LAMP 6 FA 4421D EARE EAR 1
HIN FLASHER 4421E EARF EAR 5
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 4421F EARG EAR 8
HIN ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT EAS EAO 000000000
HIN ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT 4422D EASA EAS 0
HIN LIGHT ASSY 4422A EASB EAS 8

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/75

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

00000000111111112222222233333333444444445555556666666677777777779
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN LAMP	2 EA	4422B	EASC	EAS	1	
HIN MOTOR		4422C	EASD	EAS	5	
HIN SWITCH		4422D	EASE	EAS	A	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER		4422E	EASF	EAS	8	
HIN FORMATION LIGHTS			EAT	EAQ		000000000
HIN FORMATION LIGHTS		4424C	EATA	EAT	0	
HIN FORM LIGHT CKTRKR		4424B	EATB	EAT	8	
HIN ROTOR TIP CONTROL		4424A	EATC	EAT	8	
HIN ROTOR TIP CKT BKR		4424B	EATD	EAT	8	
HIN ROTOR TIP SLIP RING		4424D	EATE	EAT	5	
HIN ROTOR TIP BRUSHES		4424E	EATF	EAT	5	
HIN ROTOR TIP LAMPS	2 EA	4424G	EATG	EAT	1	
HIN FUSELAGE CONTROL		4424A	EATH	EAT	8	
HIN FUSELAGE CKT BKR		4424B	EATJ	EAT	8	
HIN FUSELAGE LIGHT	4 EA	4424C	EATK	EAT	1	
HIN FUSELAGE LAMPS	4 EA	4424G	EATL	EAT	1	
HIN LANDING LIGHTS			EAU	EAQ		EAV 000000100
HIN LANDING LIGHT		44230	EAUA	EAU	0	
HIN SWITCH ON-OFF		4423A	EAUB	EAU	A	
HIN SWITCH EXT-RET		4423B	EAUC	EAU	5	
HIN LIGHT ASSY		4423C	EAUD	EAU	8	
HIN LIMIT SWITCH		4423D	EAUE	EAU	1	
HIN LAMP		4423E	EAUF	EAU	A	
HIN MOTOR		4423F	EAUG	EAU	8	
HIN CKT BKRS	2 EA	4423G	EAUH	EAU	8	
HIN SEARCH LIGHT			EAV	EAQ		K EAU 000000A00
HIN SEARCHLIGHT		44250	EAVA	EAV	0	
HIN SWITCH EXT-RET-LEFT-RIGHT		4425A	EAVB	EAV	8	
HIN SWITCH ON-OFF-STOW		4425B	EAVC	EAV	8	
HIN LIMIT SWITCH		4425C	EAVD	EAV	1	
HIN CKT BKRS	2 EA	4425D	EAVE	EAV	8	
HIN SEARCHLIGHT ASSY		4425F	EAVF	EAV	8	
HIN MOTOR ROTATIONCK		4425F	EAVG	EAV	A	
HIN MOTOR EXT-RET		4425G	EAVH	EAV	A	
HIN LAMP		4425H	EAVJ	EAV	A	
HIN CABIN ENVIRONMENT			EB	E		000000000
HIN CABIN VENTILATION			EBA	EB		111111111
HIN PEDESTAL VENT OUTLET		4111H	EBAA	EBA	0	
HIN VENT AIR OUTLETS		4111L	EBAB	EBA	0	
HIN DRAIN HOSE		4111M	EBAD	EBA	0	
HIN CLAMPS		4111P	EBAE	EBA	1	
HIN VALVE VENT AIR CHECK	2 FA	4112D	EBAF	EBA	0	
HIN VENT AIR INTAKES	2 EA	4112G	EBAG	EBA	0	
HIN VENT PUSH-PULL CABLE	2 EA	4113N	EBAH	EBR	5	
HIN CABIN HEAT			EBB	EB		555555555
HIN DUCT SEL VAL-DOOR POST		4111E	EBBA	EBB	1	
HIN DOOR POST OUTLETS		4111F	EBBB	EBR	0	
HIN DUCT SEL VAL-PEDESTAL		4111G	EBBC	EBR	1	
HIN PEDESTAL OUTLET		4111H	EBBD	EBB	0	
HIN VALVE DOOR POST OUTLET		4112C	EBBE	EBB	3	

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PG0095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

00000000111111111122222222223333333333444444444455555555556666666666777777777788
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN BLOWER ASSIST		EBG	FAA	111111111
HIN BLOWER ASSIST		EBG	FAA	111111111
HIN BLOWERS	2 EA	EBCA	EBG	5
HIN CKT BKR		EBGB	EBG	8
HIN BLOWER SWITCH		EBCC	EBG	4
HIN WARM AIR DISTRIBUTION		EBE	EBR	AAAAAAAAA
HIN WARM AIR DISTRIBUTION		EBE	ECA	AAAAAAAAA
HIN NOISE SUPPRESSOR	4111B	EBEA	EBE	1
HIN PLENUM	4111C	EBFB	EBE	1
HIN DUCT PLENUM-SEL VALVE	4111D	EBEC	EBE	1
HIN COUPLING	4111E	EBFD	EBE	1
HIN CLAMP	4111P	EBEE	EBE	1
HIN HEAT AND DEFROST SELECTOR	4112E	EBFF	EBE	2
HIN AFT OUTLET SWITCH	4113F	EBEG	EBE	2
HIN AFT OUTLET LIMIT SWITCH	4113G	EBEH	EBE	2
HIN MIXING/TEMP CONTROL		EBF	EBE	AAAAAAAAA
HIN VALVE VAR CONTROL MIXING	4112B	EBFA	EBF	8
HIN OVERHEAT SWITCH	4113D	EBFB	EBF	8
HIN OVERHEAT RELAY	4113E	EBFC	EBF	5
HIN TEMPERATURE SELECTOR	4113H	EBFD	EBF	5
HIN REMOTE SENSOR	4113J	EBFE	EBF	5
HIN SENSING TUBE	4113K	EBFF	EBF	1
HIN BLEED AIR SUPPLIED		EBG	EBF	AAAAAAAAA
HIN TUBE-ENG TO MIX VALVE 2	FA4111A	EBGA	EBG	1
HIN VALVE BLEED AIR SHUTOFF 2	4112A	EBGB	EBG	1
HIN CKT BKR HEAT	4113A	EBGC	EBG	8
HIN HEATER SWITCH	4113B	EBGD	EBG	A
HIN WINDSHIELD CLEAR		EC	E	111111111
HIN WINDSHIELD DEFROST		ECA	EC	Y 011010110
HIN DEFROST NOZZLES	2 EA	ECAB	ECA	0
HIN DEFROG HEAT/VENT NYE	4112F	ECAB	ECA	0
HIN LEVER	4113L	ECAC	ECA	1
HIN ARM	4113M	ECAD	ECA	1
HIN RAIN REMOVAL		ECB	EC	G 000010110
HIN PILOTS RAIN REMOVAL		ECC	ECB	111111111
HIN PILOTS RAIN REMOVAL		ECC	ECB	H AAAAAAAAAA
HIN WIPER ASSY	12EAA	ECCA	ECC	1
HIN WIPER	12EAB	ECCB	ECC	8
HIN STOP	12EAC	ECCC	ECC	0
HIN HEADGUARD	12EAD	ECCD	ECC	0
HIN CKT BKR	12EBA	ECCE	ECC	8
HIN SELECTOR SWITCH	12EBB	ECCF	ECC	5
HIN WIPER SWITCH	12EBC	ECCG	ECC	8
HIN RESISTOR PANEL	12EBD	ECCH	ECC	2
HIN MOTOR/CONVERTER	12EBE	ECCJ	ECC	A
HIN FLIGHT CONTROLS		F	F	AAAAAAAAA
HIN MAIN MOTOR POSITIONED		FAA	F	QAAAAAAAAA
HIN HUB	151B0	FAAA	FAA	8
HIN GRIP	2 EA 151BA	FAAB	FAA	A
HIN DRAG BRACE	2 EA 151BB	FAAC	FAA	8

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN	STATIC STOP	2 EA	151PD	FAAD	FAA	0
HIN	BLADE BOLT MAINC	2 EA	151RE	FAAE	FAA	A
HIN	BLADE BOLT WOPAG LINKC4	EA	151RE	FAAF	FAA	8
HIN	GRIP RESERVOIR	2 EA	151RF	FAAG	FAA	1
HIN	TRUNNION		151RG	FAAH	FAA	3
HIN	PILLOW BLOCK RESERVOIR2	EA	151RH	FAAJ	FAA	1
HIN	PILLOW BLOCK	2 EA	151RJ	FAAK	FAA	3
HIN	MAST NUT		151RK	FAAL	FAA	A
HIN	STRAP	2 EA	151RL	FAAM	FAA	A
HIN	RADIUS RING KYOKEC	2 EA	151RM	FAAN	FAA	A
HIN	PIN STRAP	4 EA	151RN	FAAP	FAA	A
HIN	BLADE ASSY	2 EA	151RO	FAAQ	FAA	8
HIN	TRIM TAB	2 EA	151RA	FAAR	FAA	0
HIN	TRAILING EDGE STRIP	2 EA	151RH	FAAS	FAA	0
HIN	TIP CAP	2 EA	151RC	FAAT	FAA	0
HIN	LEADING EDGE	2 EA	151RD	FAAU	FAA	0
HIN	SKIN	2 EA	151RE	FAAV	FAA	0
HIN	CORE	2 EA	151RF	FAAW	FAA	0
HIN	MAIN ROTOR CONTROLS			FAB	FAA	AAAAA
HIN	STABILIZER BAR		151AG	FABA	FAB	1
HIN	CENTER FRAME		151AA	FABB	FAB	1
HIN	MIXING LEVER	2 EA	151AB	FABC	FAB	8
HIN	SUPPORT		151AC	FABD	FAB	1
HIN	WIRE ROPE		151AD	FABE	FAB	1
HIN	DAMPERS	2 EA	151AE	FABF	FAB	1
HIN	TUBE	2 EA	151AF	FABG	FAB	0
HIN	CNTAFRAME/MIXLEVER BEARING		151AG	FABH	FAB	1
HIN	CNTR FRAME/SUPPORT BEARING		151AH	FABJ	FAB	1
HIN	MIX LEVER/CNTR TUBE BEARING		151AJ	FABK	FAB	1
HIN	DAMPER SUPPORT		151AK	FABL	FAB	1
HIN	PITCH HORNS	2 EA	151FC	FARM	FAB	8
HIN	SCISSORS AND SLEEVE ASSY		151GO	FARMA	FAB	3
HIN	SLEEVE		151DA	FARN	FAR	1
HIN	SLEEVE BEARING SET		151DB	FABP	FAB	2
HIN	HUB		151DC	FABQ	FAB	2
HIN	SCISSORS		151DD	FABR	FAB	1
HIN	PIVOT BEARING SET		151DE	FABS	FAB	1
HIN	BEARING LINER		151DG	FABT	FAB	1
HIN	DRIVE PLATE		151DJ	FABU	FAB	8
HIN	SCISSORS/MIX TUB BEARING		151DK	FABV	FAB	1
HIN	BOLTS		151DL	FABW	FAB	8
HIN	SWASHPLATE AND SUPPORT ASSY		151EO	FABX	FAR	8
HIN	SUPPORT		151EA	FABY	FAB	1
HIN	SUPPORT BUSHING		151EB	FABZ	FAB	1
HIN	GIMBAL RING		151EC	FABZA	FAB	2
HIN	GIMBAL RING BEARING		151ED	FABZB	FAB	2
HIN	INNER RING		151EE	FABZC	FAB	1
HIN	OUTER RING		151EF	FABZD	FAB	1
HIN	SWASH PLATE BEARING		151EG	FABZE	FAB	1
HIN	OUTER COVER		151EJ	FABZF	FAB	0

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0C00J000J1111111111222222222233333333334444444444555555555566666667777777777
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

D-42

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000011111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN MIXING LEVER		1421P	FAFP	FAE	8	
HIN FORCE GRADIENTS	2 FA	1421J	FAED	FAE	0	
HIN MAGNETIC BRAKE	2 FA	1421K	FAER	FAE	0	
HIN FORCE TRIM SWITCH		1421L	FALS	FAE	0	
HIN FORCE TRIM SWITCH		1421L	FALS	FCC	0	
HIN PILOTS CYCLIC CONTROLS			FAF	FAE		111111111
HIN PILOTS CYCLIC CONTROLS			FAF	FAE	H	AAAAAAAAA
HIN STICK		1421A	FAFA	FAF	8	
HIN GRIP		1421B	FAFH	FAF	0	
HIN FRICTION NUT		1421C	FAFC	FAF	0	
HIN PILOTS LATERAL CONTROL TUB		1421N	FAFD	FAF	8	
HIN SLEEVE		1421E	FAFE	FAF	1	
HIN BOLTS		1421V	FAFF	FAF	8	
HIN GIMBAL		1421D	FAFG	FAF	1	
HIN BOOT		1421H	FAFH	FAF	0	
HIN AUX LONGITUDINAL CONTROL			FBA	F		000111100
HIN ATTENUATION			FRB	FBA		111111111
HIN ELEVATORS POSITIONED			FBC	FBC		AAAAAAAAA
HIN HORN		110RE	FRCA	FBC	8	
HIN HORN BEARING		110EF	FRCH	FBC	2	
HIN SUPPORT BEARING	92 EAC	110RG	FRCC	FBC	1	
HIN SYNC ELEVATOR	2 EA	110BO	FRCU	FBC	0	
HIN SKIN	2 EA	110BA	FRCF	FBC	0	
HIN SPAR	2 EA	110BB	FRCF	FBC	0	
HIN RIB	2 EA	110BC	FRCG	FBC	0	
HIN TRAILING EDGE PLATE	2 EA	110BD	FRCH	FBC	0	
HIN BOLT	F2 EA	110BH	FRCH	FBC	0	
HIN ELEVATOR CONTROLS			FRD	FBC	8	AAAAAAAAA
HIN CONTROL TUBES		1431A	FRDA	FBD	8	
HIN IDLER		1431B	FRDB	FBD	8	
HIN IDLER SUPPORT		1431C	FRDC	FBD	1	
HIN BELLCRANKS		1431D	FRDD	FBD	8	
HIN WALKING BEAM ASSY		1431E	FRDE	FBD	3	
HIN GUIDES		1431F	FRDF	FBD	1	
HIN ANTI TORQUE/DIRECTIONAL CON			FCA	F		09A111220
HIN ANTI TORQUE/DIRECTIONAL CON			FCA	F	8	000000000
HIN TAIL ROTOP CONTROLLED			FCB	FCA		AAAAAAAAA
HIN TAIL ROTOR		15200	FCBA	FCB	0	
HIN BLADE	2 EA	152A0	FCBB	FCB	8	
HIN GRIP PLATE	2 EA	152AA	FCBC	FCB	8	
HIN BUSHING	2 EA	152AB	FCBD	FCB	1	
HIN SKIN	2 EA	152AC	FCBE	FCB	0	
HIN CURVE	2 EA	152AD	FCBF	FCB	0	
HIN HUB		152B0	FCBH	FCB	8	
HIN TRUNNION SET		152BA	FCBJ	FCB	8	
HIN YOKE		152BB	FCBK	FCB	8	
HIN RETAINING NUT		152BC	FCBL	FCB	A	
HIN BEARING, PITCH CHANGE		152BD	FCBM	FCB	2	
HIN BEARING, FLAPPING		152BE	FCBN	FCB	1	
HIN TAIL ROTOR CONTROLS			FCC	FCB		AAAAAAAAA

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

00000000111111111222222222333333333344444444445555555556666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

MIN	LEVER	1442A	FCCA	FCC	8
HIN	IDLER	1442H	FCCB	FCC	8
HIN	CONTROL TUBE	1442C	FCCC	FCC	8
HIN	CONTROL TUBE BEARING	1442D	FCCD	FCC	2
HIN	BEARING HOUSING	1442E	FCCF	FCC	1
HIN	CROSSHEAD	1442F	FCCF	FCC	8
HIN	CROSSHEAD BEARING	1442G	FCCG	FCC	2
HIN	PITCH LINK 22 PAK	1442H	FCCB	FCC	8
HIN	COUNTERWEIGHT PELLERANK	1442K	FCCK	FCC	3
HIN	COUNTERWEIGHT LINK	1442L	FCCL	FCC	8
HIN	CONTROL TUBES	1441J	FCCM	FCC	8
HIN	BELLERANKS	1441L	FCCN	FCC	8
HIN	BOOST CYLINDER	1441M	FCCP	FCC	7
HIN	LINK	1441N	FCCQ	FCC	8
HIN	MAGNETIC BRAKE	1441H	FCCR	FCC	0
HIN	FORCE GRADIENT	1441G	FCCS	FCC	0
HIN	LEVERS	1441K	FCCT	FCC	8
HIN	PITCH HORN	152AE	FCCU	FCC	8
HIN	PILOTS CONTROLS		FCD	FCC	1111111111
HIN	PILOTS CONTROLS		FCD	FCC	H AAAAAAAAAA
HIN	PEDALS	1441A	FCCA	FCD	1
HIN	PEDAL ADJUSTER LINKAGE	1441B	FCCB	FCD	5
HIN	PEDAL ADJUSTER SHAFT	1441C	FCCD	FCD	0
HIN	RIGHT ANGLE DRIVE	1441D	FCCD	FCD	0
HIN	PEDAL ADJUSTER CHAIN	1441E	FCCD	FCD	0
HIN	TUBE, PEDAL TO ADJUSTER	1441F	FCCD	FCD	8
HIN	TAIL ROTOR DRIVE		FCE	FCD	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN	TAIL ROTOR DRIVE QUILL	2611B	FCEA	FCE	8
HIN	TAIL ROTOR DRIVESHAFT	2651C	FCEB	FCE	0
HIN	SHAFT SECTION 26 PAK	2651A	FCEP	FCE	8
HIN	CLAMP MULTIK	2651B	FCEQ	FCE	1
HIN	HANGER ASSY 14 EAK	2661C	FCEB	FCE	8
HIN	HANGER 24 EAK	2661A	FCEB	FCE	3
HIN	OUTER COUPLING	2661B	FCEB	FCE	8
HIN	SPHERICAL COUPLING 24 EAK	2661C	FCEB	FCE	3
HIN	SHAFT COUPLING 24 EAK	2661D	FCEB	FCE	8
HIN	SEAL 24 EAK	2661E	FCEB	FCE	1
HIN	BEARING 24 EAK	2661F	FCEB	FCE	2
HIN	TAIL ROTOR CHIP DETECTION		FCF	FCB	I FCG AAAAAAAAAA
HIN	T42 DEG GEARBOX CHIP DET	2621E	FCFA	FCF	A
HIN	T42 DEG GEARBOX CHIP DET LT	2621F	FCFB	FCF	A
HIN	T90 DEG GEARBOX CHIP DET	2641E	FCFC	FCF	A
HIN	90 DEG GEARBOX CHIP DET LT	2641F	FCFD	FCF	A
HIN	SEGMENT	4432E	FCFE	FCF	1
HIN	LAMP	4432F	FCFG	FCF	1
HIN	TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX DRIVE		FCG	FCB	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN	TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX DRIVE		FCG	FCB	FAAAAAAAAAAA
HIN	TAIL ROTOR 42 DEG GEARBOX	2631D	FCGB	FCG	8
HIN	INPUT QUILL	2631A	FCGC	FCG	8
HIN	OUTPUT QUILL	2631B	FCGD	FCG	8

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PG0095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000011111111122222222233333333344444444455555555666666667777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
MIN FILLER CAP 26310 FCGE FCG 0
MIN SIGHT GAGE 26310 FCGF FCG 0
MIN TAIL ROTOR 90 DEG GEARBOX 26410 FCGG FCG 8
MIN INPUT OUIII 2641A FCGH FCG 8
MIN OUTPUT OUIII 2641B FCGJ FCG 8
MIN FILLER CAP 2641C FCGK FCG 0
MIN SIGHT GAGE 2641D FCOL FCG 0
MIN ROTOR SHAFT 2641G FCGM FCG 9
MIN HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION FDA FAK S072222770
MIN HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION FDA FAK B S000090000
MIN HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION FDA FAK H SAAAAAAAAAA
MIN HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION FDA FAC F999999999
MIN HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION FDA FAF F999999999
MIN SYSTEM NO.1 CONTROL/DIST LFDB FCC 001010100
MIN SYSTEM NO.1 CONTROL/DIST LFDB FDA KRFBH AAAAAAAAAA
MIN SYSTEM NO. 2 DIST LFDB FDA KLFBH AAAAAAAAAA
MIN ELECTRICAL CONTROLS 45130 LFDBA LFDB 0
MIN ELECTRICAL CONTROLS 45130 RFDBA RFDB 0
MIN CKT BKR 4513A LFDBB LFDB 0
MIN CKT BKR 4513A RFDBB RFDB 0
MIN CONTROL SWITCH 4513B LFDBA LFDB 0
MIN CONTROL SWITCH 4513B RFDBA RFDB 0
MIN BYPASS VALVE 4513C LFDBD LFDB 1
MIN BYPASS VALVE 4513C RFDBD RFDB 1
MIN MASTER SWITCH 4513H LFDBE LFDB 0
MIN MASTER SWITCH 4513H RFDBE RFDB 0
MIN PRIORITY RELAY 4513J LFDBF LFDB 0
MIN PRIORITY RELAY 4513J RFDBF RFDB 0
MIN PRESSURE SWITCH 4513F LFDBG LFDB 5
MIN PRESSURE SWITCH 4513F RFDBG RFDB 5
MIN SYSTEM PRESSURE LFDC LFDB AAAAAA
MIN SYSTEM PRESSURE LFDC LFDB FAAAAA
MIN SYSTEM PRESSURE RFDC RFDB AAAAAA
MIN SYSTEM PRESSURE RFDC RFDB FAAAAA
MIN RESERVOIR 45110 LFDBA LFDB 1
MIN RESERVOIR 45110 RFDBA RFDB 1
MIN SIGHT PLUG 4511A LFDBB LFDB 0
MIN SIGHT PLUG 4511A RFDBB RFDB 0
MIN FILLER CAP 4511B LFDBD LFDB 0
MIN FILLER CAP 4511B RFDBD RFDB 0
MIN FILLER SCREEN 4511C LFDBD LFDB 0
MIN FILLER SCREEN 4511C RFDBD RFDB 0
MIN VENT SCREEN 4511D LFDBE LFDB 0
MIN VENT SCREEN 4511D RFDBE RFDB 0
MIN SCUDDER DRAIN 4511F LFDBF LFDB 1
MIN SCUDDER DRAIN 4511F RFDBF RFDB 1
MIN PUMP 4512A LFDBG LFDB A
MIN PUMP 4512A RFDBG RFDB A
MIN CHECK VALVE 4512B LFDBH LFDB 1
MIN CHECK VALVE 4512B RFDBH RFDB 1

```


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

000000000111111111122222222223333333333444444444445555555555666666666677777777773
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN RELIEF VALVE	4512C	LFDCJ	LFDC	2
HIN RELIEF VALVE	4512C	RFDCJ	RFDC	2
HIN INT. VALVE AND FILTER ASSY	4512D	LFDCJ	LFDC	8
HIN INT. VALVE AND FILTER ASSY	4512D	RFDCJ	RFDC	8
HIN PRESS OPER SHUT OFF VALVE	4512E	LFDCJ	LFDC	1
HIN PRESS OPER SHUT OFF VALVE	4512E	RFDCJ	RFDC	1
HIN GROUND TEST COUPLING	4512F	LFDCM	LFDC	0
HIN GROUND TEST COUPLING	4512F	RFDCM	RFDC	0
HIN DUST CAP	4512G	LFDCN	LFDC	0
HIN DUST CAP	4512G	RFDCN	RFDC	0
HIN FILTER ELEMENT PRESSK	4512H	LFDCP	LFDC	1
HIN FILTER ELEMENT PRESSK	4512H	RFDCP	RFDC	1
HIN FILTER ELEMENT RETURNK	4512J	LFDCQ	LFDC	0
HIN FILTER ELEMENT RETURNK	4512J	RFDCQ	RFDC	0
HIN ACCUMULATOR	4512K	LFDCR	LFDC	1
HIN ACCUMULATOR	4512K	RFDCR	RFDC	1
HIN IRREVERSIBLE VALVE	4512M	LFDCS	LFDC	1
HIN IRREVERSIBLE VALVE	4512M	RFDCS	RFDC	1
HIN HYD FILTER IND	4513K	LFDCJ	LFDC	0
HIN HYD FILTER IND	4513K	RFDCJ	RFDC	0
HIN NO 1 HYD PUMP OUIII	2611C	LFDCU	LFDC	A
HIN NO 2 HYD PUMP OUIII	2611J	RFDCU	RFDC	A
HIN THERMAL RELIEF VALVE	4512N	LFDCV	LFDC	1
HIN THERMAL RELIEF VALVE	4512N	RFDCV	RFDC	1
HIN SYSTEM FAILURE WARNING		LFDD	LFDB	00000000
HIN SYSTEM FAILURE WARNING		RFDD	RFDB	00000000
HIN PRESSURE SWITCH	4513F	LFDDA	LFDD	8
HIN PRESSURE SWITCH	4513F	RFDDA	RFDD	8
HIN LAMP	4513G	LFDDR	LFDD	A
HIN LAMP	4513G	RFDDR	RFDD	A
HIN SEGMENT	4432E	LFDDJ	LFDD	A
HIN SEGMENT	4432E	RFDDJ	RFDD	A
HIN LAMP	4432F	LFDDJ	LFDD	A
HIN LAMP	4432F	RFDDJ	RFDD	A
HIN GROUND CONTROL		G		AAAAA
HIN GROUND MANEUVER		GA	G	00000000
HIN GROUND HANDLING WHEELS	13210	GAA	GA	0
HIN TOW FITTING	1311F	GAB	GA	1
HIN EYE BOLT	1311K	GAC	GA	1
HIN WHEELS	1321A	GAD	GA	1
HIN TIRES	1321H	GAE	GA	1
HIN TUBES	1321C	GAF	GA	1
HIN PUMP HYDRAULIC	1321D	GAG	GA	1
HIN CRADLE	1321E	GAH	GA	0
HIN BELL CRANK	1321F	GAJ	GA	0
HIN RAMS	1321G	GAK	GA	0
HIN HOSE	1321H	GAL	GA	0
HIN PIN ATTACHMENT	1321J	GAM	GA	0
HIN U-BOLT	1321K	GAN	GA	0
HIN TRUNNION	1321L	GAP	GA	0

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

00000000J111111111222222223333333334444444445555555566666666777777777					
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890					
HIN CLEVIS	132IM	GAQ	GA	0	
HIN MISSION SUPPORT		M			AA44A44A
HIN OFFENSIVE ARMAMENT		MA	M		001111100
HIN AIMING		MAA	MA		000000000
HIN XM-60 SIGHT	75250	MAAA	MAA	8	
HIN MOUNT	7525A	MAAH	MAA	1	
HIN POWER CONTROL HOUSING	7525B	MAAC	MAA	1	
HIN BODY ASSY	7525C	MAAD	MAA	8	
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	7525D	MAAE	MAA	8	
HIN RETICLE LAMP	7525E	MAAF	MAA	A	
HIN RETICLE LAMP SWITCH	7525F	MAAG	MAA	A	
HIN RHEDSTAT	7525G	MAAH	MAA	A	
HIN GUNS/GRENADE LAUNCHERS		MAB	MA		000000000
HIN M-93 WEAPON	75110	MABA	MAB	0	
HIN CONTROL BOX	7511A	MABB	MAB	8	
HIN POWER CABLE	7511B	MABC	MAB	A	
HIN FEEDERS	7511C	MABD	MAB	5	
HIN MOTOR	7511D	MABE	MAB	A	
HIN CHUTE LINK	7511E	MABF	MAB	1	
HIN RELEASE PIN	7511F	MABG	MAB	1	
HIN YOKE AND SADDLE	7511G	MABH	MAB	1	
HIN MOUNT PINTLE	7511I	MABI	MAB	8	
HIN GAU-28/A GUN	7511J	MABK	MAB	8	
HIN UPPER AMMO CAN SUPPORT	7511K	MABL	MAB	1	
HIN LOWER AMMO CAN SUPPORT	7511L	MABM	MAB	1	
HIN AMMO CAN COVERS	7511N	MABN	MAB	0	
HIN CHUTES AMMO	7511P	MABP	MAB	1	
HIN CHUTES AMMO SUPPORT	7511R	MABQ	MAB	1	
HIN CHUTE CABLE	7511S	MABR	MAB	1	
HIN M-23 WEAPON	75120	MABS	MAB	0	
HIN GUN	75121	MABT	MAB	8	
HIN MOUNT	75122	MABU	MAB	8	
HIN EJECTION BAG	75123	MABV	MAB	0	
HIN AMMUNITION BOX	75124	MABW	MAB	1	
HIN AMMUNITION CHUTE	75125	MABX	MAB	1	
HIN XM-129 GRENADE LAUNCHER	75360	MABY	MAB	0	
HIN LAUNCHER	7536A	MABZ	MAB	8	
HIN GUN CRADLE	7536B	MAHZ4	MAB	2	
HIN GUN DRIVE MOTOR	7536C	MAHZ3	MAB	A	
HIN GUN DRIVE ADAPTER	7536D	MAHZC	MAB	1	
HIN ADAPTER SHAFT	7536E	MAHZD	MAB	1	
HIN AMMO CHUTE	7536F	MAHZE	MAB	1	
HIN MAGAZINE	7536G	MAHZF	MAB	1	
HIN MAGAZINE DRUM MOTOR	7536H	MAHZG	MAB	A	
HIN DYNAMIC PLATE	7536J	MAHZH	MAB	1	
HIN OVERLOAD SWITCHES 2 FA	75130	MARZJ	MAB	5	
HIN ARMAMENT POWER RELAYS 2A	4221F	MABZK	MAB	5	
HIN ROCKET LAUNCH		MAC	MA		K BADA 111111111
HIN EXT STOPES RACK REEAK	7547C	MACA	MAC	0	
HIN SUPPORT ASSY REEAK	7547A	MACB	MAC	0	

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN CROSS BEAM 2EAC 7547B MACC MAC 0
HIN SWAY BRACE 2EAC 7547C MACD MAC 0
HIN SUPPORT ARM 2EAC 7547D MACF MAC 0
HIN BOMB RACK 2EAC 7547E MACG MAC 8
HIN LAU-59A/B ROCKET LAUNCHER 75130 MACG MAC 0
HIN YOLKE 7513A MACH MAC 0
HIN RACK 7513B MACJ MAC 8
HIN LAUNCHER 7513C MACK MAC 8
HIN SAFETY PIN 7513E MACL MAC 0
HIN ROCKET FIRE MAD K MAE AAAAAAAAAA
HIN INTERVALUMETER 2 EA 7513D MADIA MAD 8
HIN POYARY SWITCH 2 EA 7513F MADH MAD 8
HIN POD SWITCH 2 EA 7513K MADC MAD A
HIN RESET SWITCH 2 EA 7513N MADDO MAD A
HIN ROCKET LAUNCHER JETTISON MAE MAC MAG 11111111
HIN SELECTIVE JETTISON MAF MAE MAG 11111111
HIN JETTISON SWITCH 2 EA 7513L MAFA MAF 1
HIN JETTISON CKT BKR 4221G MAFB MAF 8
HIN RELAY 7513P MAFD MAF A
HIN EMERGENCY JETTISON MAG K MAF AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ENER JETT 75140 MAGA MAG 0
HIN HANDLE 7514A MAGB MAG A
HIN CABLE 7514B MAGC MAG A
HIN CABLE GUARD 7514C MAGD MAG 0
HIN PULLEY 7514D MAGE MAG A
HIN BELLCRANK 7514E MAGF MAG A
HIN SPRINS 7514F MAGG MAG 0
HIN ARMAMENT CONTROLS MAH MAB FA44444444
HIN ARMAMENT CONTROLS MAH MAC 44444444
HIN CONTROL PANEL 7513G MAHA MAH 8
HIN MASTER SWITCH 7513H MAHH MAH A
HIN INDICATOR LIGHT 7513J MAHC MAH 0
HIN SELECTOR SWITCH 7513M MAHD MAH 8
HIN ARM CKT BKRS 2 EA 4221G MAHE MAH 5
HIN TROOP TRANSPORTATION MB M 000000000
HIN LITTER KIT 12B00 MBA MB 0
HIN STANCHION 12BAA MAB MB 0
HIN BRACKET 12BAB MBC MB 0
HIN SHELF 12BAC MBD MB 0
HIN PLATE 12BAD MBE MB 0
HIN STRAP 12BAE MBF MB 0
HIN END FITTING 12BAF MBG MB 0
HIN STRAP BRACKET 12BAG MBH MB 0
HIN LITTER COT 12BAH MBJ MB 0
HIN SAFETY BELT 12BAJ MBK MB 0
HIN TROOP SEATS 12C00 MBL MB 0
HIN HEADREST 12CAA MBM MB 0
HIN HEADREST COVER 12CAN MBN MB 0
HIN FITTING 12CAC MBP MB 0
HIN TOP RAIL 12CAD MBQ MB 0

```


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000111111111222222272233333333344444444555555555566666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN BACK RAIL 12CAF MMR MB 0
HIN FRONT RAIL 12CAF MBS MB 0
HIN SIDE RAIL 12CAG MAT MB 0
HIN SPREADER 12CAH MRU MB 0
HIN LEG BRACE 12CAJ MBV MB 0
HIN LEG 12CAK MBW MB 0
HIN STANCHION 12CAL MBX MB 0
HIN SAFETY BELT 12CAM MBY MB 0
HIN COVER .4 MAN 12CAN MBZ MB 0
HIN COVER .2 MAN 12CAP MBZA MB 0
HIN COVER .1 MAN 12CAQ MBZB MB 0
HIN STORAGE STRAP 12CAR MBZC MB 0
HIN EXTERNAL CARGO SUSPENSION M COAAAAA00
HIN HOOK 12AAA MCAA MCA 0
HIN YOKE 12AAB MCAB MCA 0
HIN BUMPER 12AAC MCAC MCA 0
HIN SHAFT 12AAU MCAD MAC 0
HIN SWIVEL HOUSING 12AAF MCAE MAC 0
HIN LINK 12AAG MCAF MAC 0
HIN CARGO RELEASE MCB MCA K BADA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN CARGO RELEASE MCB MCBX K FDA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN HOOK 12AAA MCHA MCR A
HIN LEVER 12AAE MCBB MCR A
HIN DUMMY CARD TO AVOID DUP REC MCBX MCA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ELECTRICAL RELEASE MCC MCR MCD 11111111
HIN ELECTRICAL CONTROLS 12ABO MCCA MCC 0
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER 12ABA MCCB MCC 8
HIN ARMING SWITCH 12ABB MCCC MCC A
HIN RELEASE SWITCH #2 EAC 12ABO MCCD MCC 1
HIN ARMED LIGHT 12ABE MCEE MCC 0
HIN LAMP 12ABE MCCF MCC 0
HIN RELEASE RELAY 12ABF MCGG MCC A
HIN BRUSH 12ABG MCEH MCC 8
HIN SLIPRING 12ABH MCCJ MCC 8
HIN MECHANICAL RELEASE MCD MCB K MCC AAAAAAAAAA
HIN UPPER CONTROL CABLE 12AAH MCDA MCD A
HIN LOWER CONTROL CABLE 12AAJ MCB B MCD A
HIN MECHANICAL CONTROLS 12ACD MCCD MCD 0
HIN PEDAL 12ACA MCDD MCD 1
HIN PEDAL STOP 12ACB MCEE MCD 0
HIN CABLE 12ACC MCDF MCD A
HIN CABLE CONNECTOR 12ACD MCDG MCD A
HIN CABLE GUIDE 12ACE MCDH MCD 1
HIN SPRING 12ACF MCDJ MCD 0
HIN PULLEY 12ACG MCDK MCD A
HIN PULLEY BRACKET 12ACH MCDL MCD 1
HIN LOUSPEKER SYSTEM MD M CO0000000
HIN SPEAKER AMPLIFIER 69110 MDA MD 0
HIN SPEAKERS 124 EAC 6911A MDB MD 1
HIN REMOTE CONTROL UNIT 6911B MDC MD 8

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111111222222222233333333344444444455555555566666666677777777777
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN DISTRIBUTION PANEL	6911C	MDU	MD	8
HIN AMPLIFIERS 63 EAC	6911D	MDF	MD	3
HIN MICROPHONE	6912A	MDF	MD	8
HIN SPEAKER SUPPORT	6912B	MDG	MD	1
HIN TAPE RECORDER	6912C	MDH	MD	1
HIN CABLE	6912D	MDJ	MD	8
HIN POWER RELAY	6912E	MDK	MD	A
HIN OVERLOAD CONTROL	6912F	MDL	MD	5
HIN CKT BRK LOUDSPEAKER	4221G	MDM	MD	8
HIN HOIST OPERATION		ME	M	000000000
HIN HOIST ACTUATION		MEA	ME	AAAAAAAAA
HIN POST	4921A	MEAA	MEA	1
HIN BOOM	4921B	MEAB	MEA	1
HIN ACTUATOR	4921C	MEAC	MEA	8
HIN ACTUATOR LEVER	4921D	MEAD	MEA	8
HIN ACTUATOR PLATE	4921E	MEAE	MEA	1
HIN QUICK DISCONNECT ADAPTER	4921F	MEAF	MEA	1
HIN TURNBUCKLE BRACE	4921G	MEAG	MEA	1
HIN BOOM COVER	4921H	MEAH	MEA	0
HIN CABLE GUIDE	4921J	MEAJ	MEA	1
HIN ROLLER	4921K	MEAK	MEA	1
HIN PULLEY	4921L	MEAL	MEA	1
HIN CABLE	4921M	MEAM	MEA	A
HIN WINCH	4921N	MEAN	MEA	A
HIN HOOK	4921P	MEAP	MFA	5
HIN TRIGGER	4921Q	MEAQ	MEA	1
HIN TRACTION SHEAVE	4921R	MEAR	MEA	8
HIN PRESSURE ROLLER	4921S	MEAS	MEA	1
HIN GUILLotine	4921T	MEAT	MEA	0
HIN HOISTING VEST	4921U	MEAU	MEA	0
HIN SAFETY VEST	4921V	MEAV	MEA	0
HIN SAFETY STRAP	4921W	MEAW	MFA	0
HIN GUILLotine CHARGE	9711B	MEAX	MEA	0
HIN FOREST PENETRATOR	49310	MEAY	MEA	1
HIN COVER	4931A	MEAZ	MEA	0
HIN STRAP	4931B	MEAZA	MEA	0
HIN SPRING	4931C	MEAZB	MEA	0
HIN HORSE COLLAR	49400	MEAZC	MEA	1
HIN STOKES LITTER	49500	MEAZD	MEA	1
HIN CABLE	4951A	MEAZE	MEA	0
HIN CLAMP	4951B	MEAZF	MEA	0
HIN D-RING	4951C	MEAZG	MEA	0
HIN STRAP	4951D	MEAZH	MFA	0
HIN HOIST CONTROLS		MEB	ME	AAAAAAAAA
HIN ELECTRICAL CONTROLS	49220	MEBA	MEB	0
HIN CIRCUIT BREAKER	4922A	MEBB	MEB	8
HIN PILOT CONTROL SWITCH	4922B	MEBC	MEB	1
HIN GUILLotine SWITCH	4922C	MEBD	MEB	0
HIN POWER RELAY	4922D	MEBE	MEB	A
HIN OVERLOAD CONTROL SWITCH	4922E	MEBF	MEB	8

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

000000001111111112222222222333333334444444445555555556666666667777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

HIN RETRACT LIMIT SWITCH	4922F	MEBG	MEB	0
HIN EXTEND LIMIT SWITCH	4922G	MEBH	MEB	8
HIN CONTROL PENDANT	4922H	MEBJ	MEB	8
HIN PENDANT CABLE	4922J	MEBK	MEB	8
HIN CONTROL BOX	4922K	MEBL	MEB	8
HIN 20 FEET WARNING LIGHT	4922L	MEBM	MEB	0
HIN LAMP	4922M	MEBN	MEB	0
HIN LANDING GEAR		N		AAAAAAAAAA
HIN GEAR SUPPORT		NA	N	00000000
HIN CROSS TUBE FWD	1311A	NAA	NA	1
HIN CROSS TUBE AFT	1311B	NAH	NA	1
HIN STRAP	1311C	NAC	NA	1
HIN SKID GEAR		NB	N	00000000
HIN SKID GEAR	1311D	NBA	NB	0
HIN SKID TUBE	1311E	NBB	NB	1
HIN SKID SHOE	1311F	NBC	NB	0
HIN CAP	1311G	NBD	NB	0
HIN STEP	1311H	NBE	NB	0
HIN SADDLE	1311J	NBF	NB	1
HIN 26V AC BUS		UAA	BDC	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN 26V AC BUS		UAA	BEC	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN 26V AC BUS		UAA	BFC	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN 26V AC BUS		UAA	BFF	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN 26VOLT AC		UAA	CCE	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN 26VOLT AC		UAA	CCN	FAAAAAAAAA
HIN 26VOLT AC		UAA	CCRb	FAAAAAAAAA
HIN INSTRUMENT TRANSFORMER	4231J	UAAA	UAA	A
HIN XFMR CKT BRK	4241C	UAAB	UAA	1
HIN ESS AC BUS		UAB	BRJ	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS AC BUS		UAB	BFM	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS AC BUS		UAB	BFP	FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL AC		UAB	CCN	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL AC		UAB	CCPB	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL AC BUS		UAB	DBCA	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL AC BUS		UAB	DBEC	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL AC BUS		UAB	EAT	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL AC BUS		UAB	UAA	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL AC BUS		UAB	UAF	FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESSENTIAL BUS	4241A	UABA	UAB	1
HIN AC POWER RELAY	4231H	UAPB	UAB	1
HIN NON ESSENTIAL AC		UAC	CCRb	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN NON ESS AC BUS		UAC	DBEC	AAAAAAAAAA
HIN NON ESSENTIAL BUS	4241B	UACA	UAC	1
HIN AC POWER RELAY	4231H	UACB	UAC	A
HIN MAIN AC SOURCE		UAD	UAB	UAG 11111111
HIN AC POWER SUPPLY	4231G	UADA	UAD	0
HIN MAIN INVERTER	4231A	UADB	UAD	A
HIN MAIN INVERTER OVERLOAD CON	4231B	UADC	UAD	5
HIN MAIN INVERTER POWER RELAY	4231C	UADD	UAD	A
HIN INVERTER CONTROL SWITCH	4231G	UADE	UAD	5

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PG0095.J191 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

00000000011111111222222223333333333444444444555555555666666666777777777
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN MAIN INV CKT CKR 4221G UADF UAD 1
HIN STANDBY AC SOURCE UAE UAC AAAAAAAAAA
HIN STANDBY AC SOURCE UAF UAG AAAAAAAAAA
HIN STANDBY INVERTER 4231G UAFA UAE A
HIN STBY INV OVERLOAD CONTROL 4231E UAEB UAE 5
HIN STBY INV POWER RELAY 4231F UAFC UAE A
HIN STBY INV CKT CKR 4221G UAFD UAE 1
HIN INVERTER CONTROL SWITCH 4231G UAFF UAE 5
HIN AC POWER STATUS UAF UAG 111111111
HIN VOLTMEETER 4251A UIFA UAF 1
HIN AC FAILURE RELAY 4251E UAEB UAF 1
HIN SEGMENT 4432E UAFA UAF 1
HIN LAMP 4432F UAFJ UAF 1
HIN STANDBY AC POWER UAG K UAD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BAAG AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BAPE AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BAQC AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BBD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BBG FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BBK AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BCE AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BDD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BDE SAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BDF FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BDG FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BDH AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BED AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BEE AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA REG AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA BFO AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA HFE AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA JFR AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA CAA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA CB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA CCL S889888888
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA CCM FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA CCPA FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA CCPB FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA CCR FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA DAB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA DAC FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA DAD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA EAA AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA EAR FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA EAS FAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA EAU AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA ERC AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA FBG AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA ECB AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ESS DC BUS UDA FCF AAAAAAAAAA

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

000000000111111112222222223333333334444444445555555556666666667777777777
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
MIN ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDA LFD FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDA RFDD FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDA MAA FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDA MAF FAAAAAAAAA
MIN ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDA MAH AAAAAAAAAA
MIN ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDA MCC AAAAAAAAAA
MIN ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDA UAD AAAAAAAAAA
MIN ESSENTIAL BUS 4221A UDA 1
MIN NON ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDB BBC AAAAAAAAAA
MIN NON ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDB EAV AAAAAAAAAA
MIN NON ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDB MD AAAAAAAAAA
MIN NON ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDB MEJ AAAAAAAAAA
MIN NON ESSENTIAL DC BUS UDB UAE AAAAAAAAAA
MIN NON ESSENTIAL BUS 4221B UDBA 1
MIN NON ESSENTIAL BUS RELAY 4221D UDBB A
MIN NON ESSENTIAL BUS SWITCH 4221F UDBC A
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BARG SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BAPE SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BAQC SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BRC SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BRD SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BRH SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BCE SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC RDR SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BDE SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BDH SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BEH SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BEE SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC REG SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BFB SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BFE SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BFF SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BFM SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC BFR SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC CAA SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC CB SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC CCD SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC DAR SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC DAD SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC DBCA SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC DBEC SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC EAA SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC EAQ S000000000
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC EBC SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC ERG SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC ECB SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC FCF SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC MAB FAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC MAH SAAAAAAAAA
MIN MAIN DC BUS UDC MCC SAAAAAAAAA

```

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PG0095.J1R1 DATE = 03/31/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

```

0000000001111111112222222223333333334444444445555555556666666667777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
HIN MAIN DC BUS UDC MD SAAAAAAAAA
HIN MAIN DC BUS UDC MEB SAAAAAAAAA
HIN MAIN DC BUS UDC UDA FAAAAAAAAA
HIN MAIN DC BUS UDC UDB FAAAAAAAAA
HIN DC POWER SUPPLY 42110 UDCA UDC 0
HIN DC POWER DISTRIBUTION 42210 UDCA UDC 0
HIN NORMAL DC SOURCE UDD UDC UDE 333333333
HIN EMERGENCY SOURCE UDE BAN AAAAAAAAAA
HIN EMERGENCY SOURCE UDE K UDD AAAAAAAAAA
HIN BATTERY 4211A UDEA UDE 8
HIN BATTERY RELAY 4211D UDEB UDE A
HIN BATTERY SWITCH 4211E UDEC UDE A
HIN BATTERY DISCONNECT 4211B UDEF UDE 5
HIN BATTERY VENT HOSES 4211C UDFF UDE 1
HIN BATTERY CONTAINER 4211F UDEH UDE 0
HIN GROUND POWER UDF BAN 000000000
HIN GROUND POWER UDF UDC 000000000
HIN EXT PWR RECEPTACLE 4211G UDFA UDF 1
HIN EXT PWR RELAY 4211H UDFB UDF A
HIN EXT PWR DIODE 4211J UDFC UDF 1
HIN EXT PWR DOOR LIMIT SWITCH 42510 UDFO UDF 0
HIN ONE GENERATOR POWER UDG UDC K UDH AAAAAAAAAA
HIN ONE GENERATOR POWER UDG UDH SAAAAAAAAA
HIN STARTER GENERATOR 4211K UDGA UDG A
HIN COOLING AIR DUCT 4211L UDGB UDG 0
HIN GENERATOR SWITCH 4211N UDGC UDG A
HIN GEN FIELD CONTROL RELAY 4211M UDGD UDG A
HIN VOLTAGE REGULATOR 4211P UDGE UDG 8
HIN VOLTAGE RHEOSTAT 4211Q UDGF UDG 8
HIN OVERVOLTAGE RELAY 4211R UDGG UDG 5
HIN REVERSE CURRENT RELAY 4211S UDGH UDG 5
HIN STARTER GENERATOR CONTROL 4211T UDGI UDG 1
HIN SHUNT CONTROL RELAY 4211U UDGL UDG 1
HIN BUS CONTROL RELAY 4221C UDGL UDG A
HIN GEN CKT BKRS #2 BAK 4221G UDGM UDG 1
HIN STARTER GEAR SHAFT 22ALG UDGN UDG A
HIN ONE GENERATOR FAILED UDH UDH FAAAAAAAAA
HIN DC POWER STATUS UDJ UDC 000000000
HIN DUAL VOLTMETER 4251A UDJA UDJ 1
HIN VOLTMETER SELECT SWITCH 4251B UDJB UDJ 1
HIN DUAL AMMETER 4251C UDJC UDJ 1
HIN SEGMENT 4432E UDJE UDJ 1
HIN LAMP 4432F UDJG UDJ 1

```

CARD COUNT IS 00001692. CARDS WITH ERRORS 00000000